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Qualified Immunity: Round Two
Andrew Coan* and DeLorean Forbes**
Abstract
For the first time in its fifty-year history, the future of
qualified immunity is in serious doubt. The doctrine may yet
survive for many years. But thanks largely to the recent mass
movement for racial justice, major reform and abolition are
now live possibilities. This development raises a host of
questions that have been little explored in the voluminous
literature on qualified immunity because its abolition has been
so difficult to imagine before now. Perhaps the most pressing is
how overworked federal courts will respond to a substantial
influx of new cases fueled by qualified immunity’s curtailment
or demise. Might judicial capacity concerns prompt judges to
take countermeasures that discourage constitutional tort suits,
effectively reproducing qualified immunity by another name?
Can anything be done to prevent this outcome?
This Article takes up these questions, which will remain
relevant as long as qualified immunity persists and become
urgent if and when the doctrine is seriously reformed or
abolished. The first step is to disaggregate the federal judiciary
into its component parts. A substantial influx of new
constitutional tort litigation poses little threat to the capacity of
the Supreme Court because the Justices would not feel
compelled to review more than a tiny fraction of these cases.
Lower courts, however, must decide every case presented to
them and many of them are already staggering under
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overwhelming workloads. Several of the tools available for
managing a sudden surge of cases would raise substantial
obstacles to the success of constitutional tort plaintiffs,
replicating many, if not all, of the effects of qualified immunity.
This outcome is not inevitable, however. Avoiding it will be
“Round Two” in the battle over qualified immunity. The most
powerful weapons in that fight, as in Round One, will be
political and social, rather than legal.
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has been a roller coaster for the doctrine
of qualified immunity, which protects government officials
against personal liability unless their conduct violates clearly
established federal law.1 Until quite recently, qualified
immunity seemed like a fixed star of the Supreme Court’s
constitutional torts jurisprudence. Not only did the Court’s
decisions embrace an expansive understanding of the doctrine,
one that protected “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law,”2 but the Court repeatedly
granted certiorari and reversed routine lower court decisions
denying qualified immunity.3 Many of these decisions were
unanimous or nearly so. 4 The signal was loud and clear: lower
courts should get with the program or face the embarrassment
of repeated reversal, with no end in sight. In 2018, one leading
scholar of the doctrine warned would-be reformers, “The legal
community can continue to argue about qualified immunity at
the margins, but should not reasonably expect any

1. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (establishing the
qualified immunity standard).
2. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
3. For a summary of the Court’s summary reversal practice in qualified
immunity cases, see William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 45, 85 (2018); see also Lynn Adelman, The Supreme Court’s
Quiet Assault on Civil Rights, DISSENT 1, 4 (2017), https://perma.cc/VFL2U3SW (PDF) (“Of the nineteen opinions [the Supreme Court] has issued
since 2001, in seventeen it found that government officials were entitled to
qualified immunity because the plaintiff could not produce a precedent with
facts close enough to those in the case at bar.”).
4. Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of
Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 48 (2015).
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transformation of the doctrine’s basic structure over its next
fifty years.”5
Then, came the summer of 2020. Following George Floyd’s
death under the knee of a Minneapolis police officer, a tidal
wave of protests placed qualified immunity reform squarely on
the national political agenda—a development that would have
been scarcely imaginable in the absence of such popular
mobilization.6 For a brief moment, qualified immunity
appeared to be in serious jeopardy in both Congress and the
courts. Commentators from across the political spectrum
criticized the doctrine’s legal foundations and policy
consequences.7 Several Justices joined the chorus, including
the Supreme Court’s most liberal member and its most
conservative.8 When we wrote the first draft of this Article in
August 2020, we described qualified immunity as “on the
ropes.”
In retrospect, that assessment seems far too optimistic.
For opponents of qualified immunity, the heady days of
summer 2020 have given way to a far murkier and more
daunting landscape. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is dead, and
her successor on the Court seems likely to be significantly
more sympathetic to qualified immunity.9 Control of Congress
is closely divided, and the Senate filibuster remains a
formidable obstacle to legislative reform. Bipartisan
5. Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1937, 1938 (2018) [hereinafter Alan Chen].
6. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Death of George Floyd Brings Debate
on Qualified Immunity for Police Misconduct, A.B.A. J. (June 2, 2020, 11:18
AM), https://perma.cc/YQH6-QVHD; Opinion, How the Supreme Court Lets
Cops Get Away with Murder, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/V6R9-K538; see also Madison Pauly, Limiting Qualified
Immunity for Cops Was a Bipartisan Issue After George Floyd’s Death. What
Happened?, MOTHER JONES (May 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/GK62-W5ER.
7. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 3, at 85; Adelman, supra note 3; Fred O.
Smith, Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future of Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093, 2113 (2016). See generally Cassens Weiss, supra
note 6 (summarizing public debate).
8. Compare Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1864 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), with Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1154–55 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
9. See, e.g., Kevin L. Cope & Joshua B. Fischman, An Empirical
Analysis of Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s Record on the Seventh Circuit (Oct.
14, 2020), https://perma.cc/B5TM-NTP7.
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negotiations have led nowhere, and popular skepticism of calls
to defund or abolish the police have made police
reform—including qualified immunity reform—a potent wedge
issue.10 As a result, the short-term prospects for curtailment or
abolition of qualified immunity have dimmed considerably.
We have not, however, simply returned to the status quo
ante. On both the legislative and the judicial fronts, the path to
qualified immunity reform or abolition now appears longer and
more tortuous than it did in the summer of 2020. And there is
certainly no guarantee of ultimate success. But thanks to the
millions of Americans who marched after George Floyd’s death,
it is still eminently possible to imagine a future in which
qualified immunity is seriously reformed or abolished. In fact,
the House of Representatives actually passed a bill that would
have abolished the doctrine in the spring of 2021.11 This
legislation stalled in the Senate, but it demonstrates a
crucially important fact: qualified immunity reform now enjoys
strong institutional support from one of the two major political
parties. This alone places qualified immunity on thinner ice
than it has been at any previous point in its fifty-year history.
The prospect that qualified immunity might be curtailed
or abolished raises a host of questions that have been little
explored in the voluminous academic literature because, until
recently, the doctrine’s repeal has been so difficult to
imagine.12 Among these, perhaps the most pressing is how the
federal courts will respond to a substantial influx of new cases
fueled by qualified immunity’s contraction or demise. The
Supreme Court has long justified qualified immunity as
necessary to protect government officials and federal courts
from an onslaught of frivolous litigation.13 And many academic
10. See, e.g., Catie Edmondson, Bipartisan Police Reform Talks Are
Officially Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/VD9Z-4GED;
Pauly, supra note 6.
11. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, 117 H.R. 1280, 117th
Cong. § 102.
12. One notable exception is Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified
Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310–11 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz,
After Qualified Immunity]. Schwartz does not take on the judicial capacity
question, however.
13. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (“Courts
should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve
difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that
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commentators have noted the ways in which judicial concern
about swelling caseloads shapes doctrinal development.14 One
leading scholar has gone so far as to argue that limiting the
volume of litigation is an essential explanation for the
Supreme Court’s steady expansion of qualified immunity.15
How will the federal courts respond if and when this protection
against docket overload is removed? Might they take
countermeasures to discourage the filing of constitutional tort
suits, effectively reproducing qualified immunity by another
name? Can anything be done to prevent this outcome?
This Article takes up these questions, which will remain
relevant as long as qualified immunity persists and will
become urgent if and when the doctrine is seriously reformed
or abolished. The first step toward answering them is to
recognize that the federal judiciary, like Congress, is a “they”
not an “it.”16 In particular, the capacity constraints operating
on the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts are very
different.17 Because the Supreme Court is primarily a court of

will have no effect on the outcome of the case.”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s
conduct . . . [should] permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.”); Huq, supra note 4, at 55 (“Justices repeatedly
emphasize caseload and judicial-economy concerns in regard to habeas,
suppression remedies, and constitutional tort.”).
14. See, e.g., ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW
JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 19 (2019) (“[I]n
certain important constitutional domains, the limits of judicial capacity
create strong pressure on the Supreme Court to adopt hard-edged categorical
rules, defer to the political process, or both.”); Huq, supra note 4, at 33
(“Rather, as with the constitutional tort context, a close study of doctrinal
development suggests that the Court is the principal architect in this fault
rule, and that looming large among its motives is an institutional concern
with judicial economy.”); Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1028 (2013) [hereinafter Levy, Judging the Flood of
Litigation] (“The justices have considered in some cases whether a particular
decision will lead to a flood of new claims into federal court . . . .”).
15. See generally Huq, supra note 4 (collecting evidence for this causal
hypothesis).
16. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (coining this
phrase).
17. See, e.g., COAN, supra note 14, at 1318 (describing the capacity
constraints on Supreme Court decision-making as a function of its unique
norms and position in the judicial hierarchy); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial
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discretionary jurisdiction, it can withstand a very large
increase in the volume of federal filings with little
discomfiture, so long as it is willing to deny certiorari in the
vast majority of those cases.18 This does not mean that the
Supreme Court’s capacity is unlimited.19 There are many areas
where the Court feels compelled to review a large fraction of
cases, most notably constitutional domains implicating the
validity of federal laws.20 In these contexts, the Court must
be—and is—very careful about inviting a large influx of new
cases.21 But constitutional tort suits do not fall into this
category because they are highly fact-bound, and their impact
is mostly confined to the interests of the litigants.22
Eliminating or limiting qualified immunity is therefore very
unlikely to strain the capacity of the Supreme Court to any
significant extent.23
The lower federal courts are a different story. As courts of
mandatory jurisdiction, the courts of appeal and district courts
have far less flexibility. They must decide every case brought
before them, and they feel strong pressure to do so relatively
expeditiously.24 When the volume of litigation increases
substantially, the lower federal courts must stretch their

Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422, 427
(2012) (same).
18. See COAN, supra note 14, at 2223 (explaining the wide latitude the
Court enjoys in “normal domains,” where it feels no pressure to review more
than a small fraction of cases); Coan, supra note 17, at 428 (noting that the
Court could “respond to any increase in demand simply by refusing to hear
more cases”).
19. See Coan, supra note 17, at 429 (“[T]he number of cases the Court
must decide to eliminate significant disuniformity must not exceed its
capacity of one hundred fifty to two hundred full-dress decisions per Term.”).
20. COAN, supra note 14, at 29; Coan, supra note 17, at 428.
21. See generally COAN, supra note 14 (collecting examples); Coan, supra
note 17 (same).
22. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 3, at 85 (“[M]ost of the Court’s qualified
immunity
decisions
are
just
fact-bound
applications
of
the
already-established principle that liability requires clearly established law.”).
23. See COAN, supra note 14, at 21. The Supreme Court does
occasionally act to limit the workload of federal courts but only very
sporadically. See Part II.D infra.
24.
See Coan, supra note 17, at 429.
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limited resources even thinner.25 That means something has to
give. This has been a particularly acute problem in the federal
courts of appeal, whose dockets have vastly expanded in the
past several decades.26 The result is a system of judicial triage,
in which the traditional elements of appellate review—oral
argument, extensive engagement and deliberation by Article
III judges, and a lengthy, written, published opinion with
precedential effect—are reserved for a select few cases deemed
to be of greatest importance. All other cases are relegated to a
second-class status.27 The federal district courts have not been
as well studied as the courts of appeal, but they too possess
tools for expeditiously disposing of cases they perceive to be of
little value.28
If courts respond to the repeal or contraction of qualified
immunity by relegating constitutional tort suits to this
disfavored category, the practical result may be something
very like qualified immunity by another name. Such a response
might even put constitutional tort plaintiffs in a worse position
overall if their cases are all lumped together in the same
low-value category, even those that could have surmounted the
hurdle of qualified immunity. As an added complication,
judicial triage mostly operates in the shadows away from
public scrutiny. This makes it especially difficult to resist,
reform, or even observe.29
None of this is inevitable. If and when the reform of
qualified immunity triggers a flood of new constitutional tort
suits taxing the capacity of the lower federal courts, judges and
clerks’ offices will have a wide array of options for managing
the strain. One of those options is to relegate constitutional
tort suits to the same second-class status as social security,
immigration, and pro se cases. But that is not the only option.
Judicial resources could instead be reshuffled, in any number
25.
See id. (describing how the “judicial commitment to timely and
efficient access to the legal system” conflicts with the lower courts’ increased
caseload).
26.
Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the
Federal Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary
Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 794 (2020).
27. See infra Parts III.B.12.
28. See infra Part III.B.3.
29. See infra Part IV.B.
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of ways, to ensure that constitutional tort suits receive judicial
attention on par with that accorded complex commercial
disputes and other cases perceived as significant by most
federal judges. Anytime the lower courts take on a substantial
influx of new cases some compromise of judicial standards is
likely to be necessary. But constitutional tort suits need not
bear the brunt of it. Persuading lower court judges that these
suits are worthy of close attention will be the next major
challenge facing advocates of governmental accountability
after the fall of qualified immunity.30
Lawyers have an important role to play in making this
case, but that role is a limited one. Because so much of the
machinery of judicial triage operates in obscurity, it is mostly
immune to lawyerly arguments.31 Much of the heavy lifting
will have to be done by social movements, working to shape the
consciousness of federal judges and the presidents who appoint
them, along with the public as a whole. If the recent mass
protests have demonstrated anything, it is that claims for
redress from injustice—particularly injustice at the hands of
the police—are not merely a cost of doing business, as the
Supreme Court has sometimes intimated.32 Still less are they a
niche or special interest. They are crucial to the legitimacy of
the American legal and political systems and, as such, a matter
of the greatest national moment.33 Only when the average
federal judge has internalized this proposition are
constitutional tort suits likely to receive first-class treatment
in the federal court system.34 Getting to this point will be
Round Two of the battle over qualified immunity.
Part I provides a brisk overview of the doctrinal landscape,
with particular emphasis on the prospects for repeal or
contraction of qualified immunity and the judicial capacity

30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part IV.B.
32. See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (“Put
simply, qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.’” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986))); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (explaining that
qualified immunity’s objective reasonableness standard “should avoid
excessive disruption of government”).
33. See infra Part I.C.2.
34. See infra Part IV.C.
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problem that this threatens to create. Part II begins the work
of disaggregating this judicial capacity problem, explaining
why reform of qualified immunity would not significantly tax
the capacity of the Supreme Court. Part III explains why the
lower federal courts are different and surveys the various tools
at their disposal for managing a substantial influx of
constitutional tort cases. Part IV evaluates the implications of
this account for qualified immunity reform and explains the
primacy of social movements and political organizing over
lawyers in Round Two of this battle.
I. THE LAY OF THE LAND
Qualified immunity has its roots in judicial interpretation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a civil action for
damages against “every person” who deprives another person
of federal constitutional or statutory rights “under color of”
state law.35 This Part begins by very briefly summarizing these
origins. It then turns to the expansion of qualified immunity in
recent decades. It concludes by explaining the recent
developments that have rendered the seemingly impregnable
fortress of qualified immunity vulnerable for the first time in
its fifty-year history. That vulnerability no longer appears as
acute as it did in the summer of 2020, and it is certainly no
guarantee that qualified immunity will ultimately be reformed
or abolished. But this makes the present moment, in which
qualified immunity reform seems genuinely possible but no
longer imminent, an especially apt one for thinking through
the judicial capacity challenges that are very likely to plague
the federal courts in a post-qualified immunity world.
A.

Origins

The Supreme Court first held that executive officers were
entitled to limited immunity from personal liability for money
damages in the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray.36 In Pierson, the
petitioners, a group of fifteen Black and white clergymen,
entered a segregated bus station in Jackson, Mississippi, while
on a “prayer pilgrimage”: a journey from New Orleans to
35.
36.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
386 U.S. 547 (1967); see id. at 557.
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Detroit to promote racial equality and integration.37 While they
were at the station, the entire party was arrested by a group of
Jackson City police officers for violating the local segregation
ordinance.38 The charges were later dropped and the ministers
sued the officers under § 1983 as well as the common law of
false arrest and imprisonment.39 The respondents prevailed on
both counts, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.40
The Supreme Court held that police officers sued under
§ 1983 could raise a “defense of good faith and probable
cause.”41 The Court described this newly recognized defense as
rooted in the common-law defenses that were available to
officers under the state common law of false arrest and
imprisonment.42 Although Pierson itself was somewhat fuzzy
on this point, subsequent decisions make clear that qualified
immunity is premised on the common-law defenses that were
well-established in 1871, when § 1983 became law, not those
available under contemporary law.43
Pierson proved to be the first of many shoes to drop. The
second was the 1982 case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald.44 Harlow
arose from the intrigue surrounding the dismissal of Ernest
Fitzgerald, an engineer and manager in the Senior Executive
Service of the U.S. Air Force.45 On November 13, 1968,
Fitzgerald testified before Congress about billions of dollars in
suspicious costs connected with the C5-A military transport
plane, which suffered from numerous technical defects.46 Two
months later, he was fired, allegedly in retaliation for his
testimony.47 Fitzgerald then brought suit against White House
37. Id. at 548–49, 552.
38. Id. at 553.
39. Id. at 549–50.
40. Id. at 550.
41. Id. at 557.
42. Id. at 556–57.
43. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (“Certain
immunities were so well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that
‘we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished
to abolish’ them.” (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554–55)).
44. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
45. Id. at 802; see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 73334 (1982).
46. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 734.
47. Id.
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staffers Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, claiming that
they had conspired to effect his wrongful dismissal.48
In an opinion written by Justice Lewis Powell, joined by
seven other justices, the Supreme Court held that Harlow and
Butterfield were entitled to qualified, though not absolute,
immunity.49 This immunity “would be defeated if an official
‘knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].’”50 The Court further
explained that “the objective reasonableness of an official’s
conduct” should be “measured by reference to clearly
established law.”51 The italicized phrase would become the
linchpin of an ever-expanding doctrine of qualified immunity
that one federal judge recently described as “unqualified
impunity.”52
B.

The Modern Era

The Supreme Court’s modern decisions have defined the
“clearly established law” necessary to defeat a claim of
qualified immunity exceptionally narrowly. In practice, the
Court requires that the facts of the prior decision clearly
establishing the law be virtually identical to those of the case
in which qualified immunity is raised by the defense.53 To be
sure, the Court frequently insists that it “do[es] not require a
case directly on point for a right to be clearly established.”54
But it insists far more vehemently that “clearly established
law should not be defined at a high level of generality.”55
Indeed, as Joanna Schwartz has observed, “The Court has
48. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.
49. Id. at 80708.
50. Id. at 815 (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
51. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
52. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. See, e.g., Joanna Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1814–15 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The
Case Against Qualified Immunity]; Adelman, supra note 3, at 4.
54. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation omitted).
55. Id. at 552 (internal quotation omitted).

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: ROUND TWO

1445

stated—and regularly restated—that government officials
violate clearly established law only when ‘the contours of a
right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”56
Needless to say, this sets an extremely high bar, especially for
plaintiffs asserting fact-sensitive claims governed by vague
constitutional standards.
To signal that it means business, the Supreme Court has
coupled this stringent standard with unusually aggressive and
often summary review of lower court decisions denying
qualified immunity.57 This is a significant departure from the
Court’s general refusal to trouble itself with mere error
correction, and the language in many of the summary reversals
“reflects apparent frustration that the message the Court has
been trying to send has not gotten through.”58 Somewhat
surprisingly, this approach has not been limited to the
conservative Justices who have been most vocal in their
defense of law enforcement prerogatives. Until fairly recently,
a majority of the Court’s applications of qualified immunity
were unanimous.59 This combination of an exceptionally high
standard for overcoming qualified immunity, frequent
summary reversal, and frequent unanimity created the
impression of an unstoppable doctrinal juggernaut.60
Academic reactions to these developments were generally
quite critical but also resigned. Many scholars noted the
irregularity of the Court’s frequent use of summary reversal in

56. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 53, at
1815 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)); see Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S 635, 640 (1987) (discussing when a right is clearly
established).
57. See, e.g., White, 137 S. Ct. at 553 (granting certiorari and summarily
reversing); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 19 (2015) (per curiam) (same);
Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 827 (2015) (per curiam) (same).
58. Richard C. Chen, Summary Dispositions as Precedent, 61 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 691, 716 (2020) [hereinafter Richard Chen].
59. See Huq, supra note 4, at 48 (“Today, the majority of applications of
qualified immunity elicit not just a majority, but unanimity, from the
Court.”).
60. See id. (“Qualified immunity—notwithstanding its potentially
significant normative and distributive effects—is thus beyond debate for the
current Court.”)
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qualified immunity cases.61 Long-time defenders of qualified
immunity argued that the Court’s recent decisions “extend[]
qualified immunity beyond any defensible rationale.”62
Long-time critics were even harsher.63 But resistance seemed
futile, especially after the appointment of two new conservative
Justices in 2017 and 2018.64 Under the circumstances, few
would have strenuously disagreed with Alan Chen’s warning
that no serious transformation of qualified immunity was
likely within the next fifty years.65 Even fewer would have had
the temerity to suggest that “the darkest hour is just before
dawn.” Yet so, for a moment, it seemed in the summer of 2020.
That moment has passed, but not without leaving a lasting
impression. Serious qualified immunity reform is now a
genuine possibility. It is therefore essential to ask what a

61. See, e.g., Richard Chen, supra note 58, at 694 (“[S]ummary reversals
have been far more commonly used to reach results the conservative Justices
generally support, favoring government officials in qualified immunity cases
and the state in federal habeas cases.”); Baude, supra note 3, at 85
(discussing the use of summary reversal in qualified immunity cases when
“the Court also summarily remanded, or ‘GVRed,’ three other qualified
immunity cases for reconsideration in light of the summary reversal, hinting
that their analysis was wrong and creating a multiplier effect”); Adelman,
supra note 3, at 4 (“Ironically, in the one summary reversal that favored a
Section 1983 plaintiff, Justices Alito and Scalia objected that the Court was
engaging in error-correcting.”).
62. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99
VA. L. REV. 207, 256 (2013); see, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J.
Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1853, 1854 (2018) (“[Q]ualified immunity is by no means perfect.”); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
933, 961 (2019) [hereinafter Fallon, Bidding Farewell] (“[T]he Court has
shown little appreciation of the rule-of-law premises that underlay
Founding-era and early nineteenth-century reliance on common law norms
and traditional rules of equitable practice to hold officials accountable for
constitutional violations.”).
63. See Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 53,
at 1836 (“Qualified immunity doctrine is historically unmoored, ineffective at
achieving its policy ends, and detrimental to the development of
constitutional law.”); Smith, supra note 7, at 2113 (“The problems with the
current doctrine are both glaring and growing. And they cannot be unseen.”).
64. Cf. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 53,
at 1798 (“In many ways, qualified immunity’s shield against government
damages liability is stronger than ever.”); Baude, supra note 3, at 86 (“The
Court’s enthusiasm for qualified immunity does not seem to be flagging.”).
65. See Alan Chen, supra note 5, at 1938.
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world without this doctrine would look like and what
challenges such a world might bring.
C.

The Prospects for Abolition, Repeal, or Reform

The previously unstoppable juggernaut of qualified
immunity began to come under increasing fire from all sides in
the latter part of the last decade. Led by Sonia Sotomayor, the
liberal justices became increasingly critical of qualified
immunity during this period.66 Around the same time,
Clarence Thomas announced his willingness to reconsider
qualified immunity “in an appropriate case,” a move
apparently inspired by William Baude’s 2018 law review
article, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?67 Whenever the most
liberal and the most conservative Justices on the Court
converge, it is worth paying attention. But far more important
was the mass popular response to the death of George Floyd.
In the fifty-three years since Pierson v. Ray, nothing has done
more to increase the salience of qualified immunity reform.
The initial wave of popular mobilization around this issue has
now crested. In its wake, substantial hurdles to reform once
again loom large, including fear of crime, opposition by police
66. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 26 (2015) (per curiam)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“By sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’
approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of the Fourth
Amendment hollow.”).
67. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing Baude, supra note 3). Others have advanced similar
arguments for decades. See, e.g., JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
AND THE WAR ON TERROR 11 (1st ed. 2017) (“Throughout the nineteenth
century, courts consistently took the position that the task of conferring
immunity was a matter for the legislative branch to consider.”); Ann
Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 396, 397 (1987) (noting divergence between modern and
historical approaches to official immunity); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and
Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2
(1972) (explaining the “contrast between the modern doctrines and earlier
American law, and the process of conceptual confusion by which the modern
rules have gradually and imperceptibly supplanted the old”). But
unsurprisingly, Baude’s unimpeachable conservative credentials seem to
have won him a more receptive audience. Cf. LAWRENCE BAUM & NEAL
DEVINS, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE
SUPREME COURT 8–14 (2019) (describing the influence of politically
like-minded elites on Supreme Court Justices). In this regard, he performed
a most valuable service.
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unions, political polarization, and the many veto points of the
federal legislative process.68 But a path forward remains
visible, thanks in large part to the enduring impact of the
popular mobilization of 2020.
1.

Counting Noses at the Supreme Court

Qualified immunity is a creature of statutory
interpretation, or perhaps the common law.69 It can therefore
be overruled by the Supreme Court or legislatively abolished
by Congress. We begin with the Supreme Court because that is
historically where all of the action on qualified immunity has
been.70 To some extent, this is an exercise in reading tea leaves
because the Court has yet to depart from its hardline approach
to qualified immunity in any significant way. But three recent
developments merit attention as potential portents of future
change. Notably, all three predate the racial justice protests
that began in May of 2020.
The first is Justice Thomas’s recent expression of “growing
concern with [the Court’s] qualified immunity jurisprudence.”71
In an argument that cites and closely tracks Baude’s article,
Thomas’s Ziglar v. Abbasi72 concurrence notes that the Civil
Rights Act of 187173 does not mention qualified immunity or
any other defenses.74 Despite this, he endorses the Court’s
oft-expressed view that “certain immunities were so well
established in 1871 . . . that we presume that Congress would
have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish them.”75
68. See, e.g., Pauly, supra note 6; Edmondson, supra note 10.
69. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Our immunity doctrine is rooted in historical analogy, based on
the existence of common-law rules in 1871, rather than in ‘freewheeling
policy choice[s].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 342 (1986))).
70. See supra Part I.AB.
71. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
72. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
73. Pub. L. No. 44-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
74. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1870 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Although the
[Civil Rights Act of 1871] made no mention of defenses or immunities, ‘we
have read it in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and
defenses rather than in derogation of them.’” (citation omitted)).
75. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
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The problem, as Justice Thomas sees it, is that the Court has
conducted the proper historically-based common law inquiry
only sporadically.76 In most other cases, he finds the Court’s
qualified immunity analysis defective.77 Thomas particularly
chastises the Court for its reliance on a “clearly established
law” standard that he argues has no foundation in the common
law of 1871.78 For all of these reasons, Thomas suggests that
the Court should “shift the focus of [its] inquiry to whether
immunity existed at common law.”79 This is obviously not a call
for total abolition of qualified immunity, but if Baude’s article
is any guide, Justice Thomas’s approach would substantially
narrow the scope of official immunity relative to current
doctrine.80
The second recent development of note is Justice
Sotomayor’s series of increasingly impassioned dissents in
qualified immunity cases, frequently joined by the late Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg.81 Several of these dissents focus on what
Sotomayor views as the Court’s one-sided approach to selecting
qualified immunity cases for review, but she has also been
sharply critical of qualified immunity itself.82 Perhaps the best
example is her biting observation in Kisela v. Hughes83 that the

76. See id. at 1871 (“In the decisions following Pierson, we have
‘completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all
embodied in the common law.’” (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 645 (1987))).
77. Id.
78. See id. (“We have not attempted to locate that standard in the
common law as it existed in 1871, however, and some evidence supports the
conclusion that common-law immunity as it existed in 1871 looked quite
different from our current doctrine.”).
79. Id. at 1872.
80. See Baude, supra note 3, at 60 (“[E]ven if one were to grant the
existence of a good-faith defense and import it to constitutional claims,
modern immunity cases have distorted those common-law rules to a
troubling degree.”).
81. See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1162 (“Such a one-sided approach to
qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law
enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
83. 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018).
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Court’s approach to qualified immunity “sends an alarming
signal to law enforcement officers and the public. It tells
officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells
the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go
unpunished.”84 While Justice Sotomayor has never expressly
called for the abolition of qualified immunity, she closes her
Kisela dissent by declaring, “[T]here is nothing right or just
under the law about this.”85 Passages like this make it fair to
surmise that she would at least give abolition of qualified
immunity a sympathetic hearing. Her conspicuous attention to
questions of racial justice point in the same direction.86
The third recent development of note is Justice Neil
Gorsuch’s “just the text ma’am” approach to statutory
interpretation, which was on prominent display in his majority
opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County.87 The significance of this
development is a bit more speculative. Bostock, of course, held
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
transgender status are sex discrimination under Title VII.88
Substantively, this has nothing to do with qualified immunity.
But Justice Gorsuch’s insistent—almost ostentatious—refusal
to look beyond the text, which the dissenters pilloried as
ahistorical literalism, is becoming his calling card.89 On this
basis, it is not difficult to imagine him sharing Justice
Thomas’s reluctance to recognize an expansive, judicially
crafted defense that finds no support in the text of § 1983 or
the common-law background against which that statute was
84. Id. at 1162.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“We
must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by
police are ‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths,
civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.”).
87. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When
the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual
considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the
law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).
88. Id. at 1743.
89. Compare id. at 1738 (“[O]nly the words on the page constitute the
law adopted by Congress and approved by the President.”), with id. at 1757
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“According to the Court, the text is unambiguous. The
arrogance of this argument is breathtaking.”), and id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts must follow ordinary meaning, not literal
meaning.”).
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adopted. It is even possible to imagine Gorsuch going further
than Thomas and refusing to recognize eighteenth century
common-law defenses on the ground that “only the written
word is the law.”90 But this may be getting too speculative.
Suffice it to say that Gorsuch has a limited track record on the
Supreme Court and shares many of the methodological
commitments that make Justice Thomas and Professor Baude
skeptical of qualified immunity.91 It is not outlandish to think
that Gorsuch might provide an additional vote to reconsider
the Court’s modern qualified immunity jurisprudence. For
those keeping count at home, this makes three potentially
persuadable Justices, two short of a majority. Before Justice
Ginsburg’s death, she would have brought the number to four.
None of the six other sitting Justices has expressed
especially serious reservations about qualified immunity. And
it would be foolish to make any strong predictions about
Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Gorsuch based on the
slender reeds we have gathered in the foregoing paragraphs.
But we have not gathered these reeds for the purpose of
making predictions. We have done so to establish a rough
picture of the state of play before May of 2020, the death of
George Floyd, and all that has come afterward. As of that
moment, qualified immunity looked strong, but subversive
stirrings were beginning beneath the surface for the first time
in many decades. Then, the world exploded.
2.

Black Lives Matter

On May 25th, 2020, George Perry Floyd, Jr., a
forty-six-year-old Black man, was killed while in police custody
in Minneapolis, Minnesota.92 Derek Chauvin, a white police

90. Id. at 1737 (majority opinion).
91. See Baude, supra note 3, at 88 (“In suggesting that the doctrine of
qualified immunity is unlawful . . . I mean . . . that the doctrine lacks legal
justification, and the Court’s justifications are unpersuasive.”); Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Until we shift
the focus of our inquiry to whether immunity existed at common law, we will
continue to substitute our own policy preferences for the mandates of
Congress.”).
92. Richard A. Opel Jr. & Kim Barker, New Transcripts Detail Last
Moments for George Floyd, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/86LESPG6 (last updated Apr. 1, 2021).
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officer, knelt on Floyd’s neck for almost ten minutes, as Floyd
was handcuffed and pinned on the pavement.93 Floyd
repeatedly protested his treatment, telling Chauvin and the
three other officers present: “I can’t breathe.”94 Video footage of
the encounter circulated around the internet and appeared in
virtually every national media outlet. The news of Floyd’s
death sparked international outrage, igniting massive protests
against racism and police brutality around the world and a
global reckoning with racial injustice.95
This mass uprising did not spring from nowhere, of course.
For years, community groups and grassroots activists across
the United States had been laying the groundwork and
building networks in preparation for just such a moment.96
Social media provided a powerful organizing tool,97 and the
enormous pent-up frustration caused by the COVID-19
pandemic fueled an outpouring of energy and passion that
would have been difficult to imagine in more normal times.98
The pervasive sense of vulnerability created by the pandemic

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio et al., A Timeline of What Has
Happened in the Year Since George Floyd’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2021), https://perma.cc/5Y7T-9ZTK (“In the hours that followed, the
cellphone video showing George Floyd’s murder would spread across the
globe and incite an uprising for racial justice nearly unparalleled in
American history.”).
96. See Manual Pastor, Is the Chauvin Conviction Just a Moment, or the
Start of Lasting Change?, PRAC. INSIGHTS COMMENTS. (July 7, 2021),
https://perma.cc/9CQG-8M8M (“The widespread reaction to the murder of
George Floyd was sparked by the sheer brazenness of Officer Chauvin, egged
on by the broken system of policing, but the groundwork for the upswell of
protest is due in large part to the tireless work of countless organizers.”).
97. See Toni Jaramilla, BLM: Uprisings to Reform, L.A. LAW., June
2021, at 30, https://perma.cc/4H4P-DCAZ (“Using social media as a powerful
tool of activism, BLM has amplified the voices of the oppressed to inspire
revolutionary and radical change. The significant movements of our time,
#MeToo and #BLM, are a result of social media activism.”).
98. See Maneesh Arora, How the Coronavirus Pandemic Helped the
Floyd Protests Become the Biggest in U.S. History, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2020,
7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/N655-4AUX (“But for many, particularly those
who had never before turned out for a BLM protest, what pushed them into
the streets was being hurt by pandemic public health measures.”).
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may also have shaped the public’s remarkably favorable initial
response to the protests.99
Among many contributing groups, Black Lives Matter
(BLM) quickly assumed an especially prominent role, to the
point that its name became virtually synonymous with the
nationwide movement for racial justice.100 BLM is a social and
political movement that was founded in 2013 by activists Alicia
Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Temeti after the acquittal of
Trayvon Martin’s killer George Zimmerman.101 The BLM
website describes the movement as “[a]n ideological and
political intervention in a world where Black lives are
systematically and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an
affirmation of Black folks’ humanity, our contributions to this
society, and our resilience in the face of deadly oppression.”102
By design, the movement is nonhierarchical and decentralized;
it consists of dozens of member-led chapters and associated
groups around the world.103
Few movements in U.S. history, and virtually none in
recent memory, have shifted the focus of public attention to
racial justice as quickly or starkly as BLM. And activists who
identify with BLM have long made ending qualified immunity
a goal of the movement.104 It is easy to see why: the
disproportionate impact of police violence and harassment on
Black Americans is a matter of extensive record.105 But

99. Cf. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2 (2008)
(recognizing human vulnerability “is essential if we are to attain a more
equal society than currently exists in the United States”).
100. See, e.g., Arora, supra note 98 (describing the protests surrounding
police violence as “Black Lives Matter or anti-police brutality protests”).
101. Herstory, BLM, https://perma.cc/RWQ2-CDCS.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See,
e.g.,
Black
Lives
Movement,
JUST.
FOR
ALL,
https://perma.cc/3WLL-97SA (advocating for legislative action to end
qualified immunity).
105. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional
Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479 (2016) (analyzing the
systemic and institutional cause of these disparities); Fagan et al., Street
Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of
Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 309, 335 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael
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qualified immunity serves as both a practical and a symbolic
obstacle to legal accountability for these injuries, sending a
powerful message about the relative importance of law
enforcement and the people, often Black, whose rights they
violate.
The George Floyd protests gave this issue far greater
salience than it has ever had before, making abolition or
significant curtailment of qualified immunity a real possibility
for the first time in five decades. The protests have influenced
the chances of reform in both the Supreme Court and
Congress, though in somewhat different ways and to a more
modest extent than initially appeared. We now consider each
in turn.
3.

Judicial Reform

Supreme Court Justices have life tenure.106 Unlike
presidential or congressional candidates, they do not have to
worry about how their position on qualified immunity will
affect their fortunes at the polls. But Supreme Court Justices
are also human beings enmeshed in social, professional, and
political networks. They talk to their friends and clerks and
colleagues. They consume the same news media as ordinary
citizens, at least those who share their basic ideological
orientation.107 Like other human beings, Supreme Court
Justices cannot avoid being influenced by the cultural
environment in which they live and work, and that
environment has been profoundly shaped by the George Floyd
protests, as it has for every American.
These dynamics are the subject of a large literature
analyzing the influence of social movements on the

D. White eds., 2010) (finding that Black men aged eighteen to nineteen had
roughly an 80 percent chance of being stopped by police in 2006).
106. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
107. See BAUM & DEVINS, supra note 67, at 9 (“Supreme Court Justices,
as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, ‘go home at night and read the newspapers
or watch the evening news on television; they talk to their family and friends
about current events.’” (quoting William R. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law
and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 768 (1986))).
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development of constitutional law.108 Jack Balkin and Reva
Siegel’s summary is both representative and helpful here:
“Courts respond to social disruption by social movements
rather than initiate it themselves; they reconstitute and
reformulate law in the light of political contestation, rationally
reconstructing and synthesizing changes in political norms
with what has come before.”109 Put differently, successful social
movements shift the boundaries of the thinkable, often in
profound ways, for Supreme Court Justices as much as anyone
else.
Prior to the George Floyd era, it was already possible to
identify as many as four Justices (including the late Justice
Ginsburg) who were open to rethinking qualified immunity to
some extent.110 The moderate liberal Justices, Elena Kagan
and Stephen Breyer, were not among this group.111 But as a
result of the BLM movement, the salience of qualified
immunity in their social networks is likely to have increased
substantially, as is the negativity with which members of those
networks view qualified immunity.112 In effect, strongly
opposing qualified immunity will become—is already in the
process of becoming—a defining characteristic of liberals and
progressives in good standing.113 This will create significant
social pressure on Justices Kagan and Breyer to rethink their
views.114 The same will go for Justice Breyer’s eventual
successor, if appointed by a Democratic president.

108. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and
Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006); Jack M. Balkin, How
Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of
the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK L. REV. 27, 52 (2005).
109. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 108, at 947.
110. See supra Part I.C.1.
111. See supra Part I.C.1.
112. Cf. Deja Thomas & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Support for Black
Lives Matter Has Decreased Since June but Remains Strong Among Black
Americans, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/DSS4-V9J9 (“A
majority of U.S. adults (55%) now express at least some support for the
[Black Lives Matter] movement . . . .”).
113. See id. (reporting that 88 percent of Democrats support the Black
Lives Matter movement).
114. See BAUM & DEVINS, supra note 67, at 3–8 (summarizing how
polarized social networks of judicial elites influence Supreme Court
decision-making).
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The conservative Justices will probably experience less
pressure on this front because their social networks are likely
to have more mixed—and even hostile—views of the BLM
movement.115 Concern about rising crime is also likely to
dampen their enthusiasm.116 But even the social networks of
conservative Justices are unlikely to be entirely immune from
this influence. Think of Mitt Romney’s decision to join a BLM
march117 and former President George W. Bush’s public letter
supporting racial justice.118 A shift of just one or two Justices
could be sufficient to tip the balance in favor of abolition or,
much more likely, limitation, of qualified immunity.
In June of 2020, the Justices declined to take up several
cases asking them to reconsider qualified immunity.119 Many
observers interpreted this as an indication that a majority of
the Court still favors qualified immunity or at least prefers
leaving this matter to Congress.120 But these are not the only
possible explanations. It could also be that neither side was
sure it has the votes, so both are biding their time. In any case,
the balance could very well shift going forward, as the Justices
absorb the lessons of this unique and still unfolding historical
moment. The Court’s recent per curiam reversals of
lower-court decisions granting qualified immunity are one

115. See Thomas & Horowitz, supra note 112 (“Among Republicans and
those who lean to the Republican Party, about two-in-ten (19%) now say they
support the movement at least somewhat, down from four-in-ten in June.”).
116. See Domenico Montanaro, Rising Violent Crime Is Likely to Present
a Political Challenge for Democrats in 2022, NPR (July 22, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://perma.cc/47ED-8LZQ (explaining that Republicans are using the rise
in violent crime in urban areas across the country to criticize Democratic
policy).
117. See McKay Coppins, Why Romney Marched, ATLANTIC (June 8,
2020), https://perma.cc/S8E6-5NRK (“A reporter asks [Mitt Romney] what
he’s doing there, and the Republican senator from Utah responds: ‘We need
to stand up and say that black lives matter.’”).
118. Statement by President George W. Bush, GEORGE W. BUSH
PRESIDENTIAL CTR. (June 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/5KR7-WGQN.
119. See, e.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020).
120. See, e.g., Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, It’s a Big Deal When the Supreme
Court Decides Not to Decide, WASH. POST (June 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Y9H6-H9BC (characterizing the Supreme Court’s decision to
deny certiorari to qualified immunity cases as a “punt”).
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preliminary indication that some such shift is underway.121
But two other, even more recent per curiam decisions—handed
down just as this Article was going to press—point in the
opposite direction.122
In sum, the influence of social movements is dynamic and
changes over time. The heightened consciousness on matters of
racial justice in liberal and progressive networks may fade,
and conservative backlash to the more far-reaching demands of
BLM may intensify, overwhelming the cross-partisan
sympathies George Floyd’s death provoked in its immediate
aftermath. Only time will tell what lessons the Justices absorb
from this searing episode.
4.

Legislative Reform

A much more straightforward path to repeal or reform of
qualified immunity is through legislation. A few years back,
this prospect would have been just as implausible as judicial
abolition.123 But unlike Supreme Court Justices, legislators
must pay close attention to public opinion and interest-group
politics. Most Republican elected officials still strongly oppose
qualified immunity reform.124 But the BLM movement has

121. See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (reversing the Fifth
Circuit’s grant of qualified immunity, despite a lack of similar precedent,
because “no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that it was
constitutionally permissible” to house a prisoner in “deplorably unsanitary
conditions” for six days); McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021)
(“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Taylor v.
Riojas.”).
122. See City of Tahlequah v. Bond, No. 20-1668, 2021 WL 4822664, at *3
(U.S. Oct. 18, 2021) (summarily reversing the lower-court’s denial of
qualified immunity “did not give fair notice” to the defendant police officer);
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, No. 20-1539, 2021 WL 4822662, at *2 (U.S. Oct.
18, 2021) (same).
123. Cf. Huq, supra note 4, at 48 (“Qualified immunity—notwithstanding
its potentially significant normative and distributive effects—is thus beyond
debate for the current Court.”).
124. See, e.g., Edmondson, supra note 10; Kathryn Watson, White House
Says Reducing Immunity for Police Is a Non-Starter, CBS NEWS (June 8,
2020, 3:43 PM), https://perma.cc/2PFF-GFNV (explaining that President
Trump considers ending qualified immunity a “non-starter”).
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made qualified immunity abolition a top legislative priority,125
and Black Americans are a major source of Democratic
votes.126 The same goes for Americans of other races who
support BLM.127 As a result, members of Congress have come
forward with a flurry of varying proposals.128
The most prominent example to date is the George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act.129 This omnibus police reform act
passed the House of Representatives in the spring of 2021 but
stalled in the face of Republican opposition in the Senate.130 It
included myriad measures intended to combat police violence
and increase police accountability.131 Most relevant to this
Article is a provision that would have eliminated qualified
immunity as a defense to civil suits against law enforcement or
correctional officers. Section 102 of the bill amends 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to add the following language:
It shall not be a defense or immunity in any action brought
under this section . . . that—(1) the defendant was acting in
good faith, or that the defendant believed, reasonably or
otherwise, that his or her conduct was lawful at the time
when the conduct was committed; or (2) the rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

125. See Demand Congress End Qualified Immunity, BLM (July 22,
2021), https://perma.cc/RW96-45JN (“[I]t should be a top priority for
Congress and the White House to end qualified immunity—to end the
prioritization of protecting white supremacy in policing and start prioritizing
the safety of our people.”).
126. See Michael Andre et al., National Exit Polls: How Different Groups
Voted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZB3V-C3RJ (showing that
Black voters accounted for 13 percent of the total vote and 87 percent of
Black voters voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in the 2020
presidential election).
127. See id. (showing that 20 percent of voters had a favorable opinion of
the Black Lives Matter movement, 78 percent of whom voted for the
Democratic presidential candidate in the 2020 presidential election).
128. See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10486, CONGRESS AND
POLICE REFORM: CURRENT LAW AND RECENT PROPOSALS 4–8 (2020) (detailing
the various legislative proposals for law enforcement reform).
129. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. (2021).
130. See H.R. 1280, 117th Cong., 167 CONG. REC. 40 (2021).
131. Cf. LAMPE, supra note 128, at 6–7 (detailing the various sections of
the Justice in Policing Act of 2020 dedicated to law enforcement reform).
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laws were not clearly established at the time of their
deprivation by the defendant.132

This language notably mirrors the language used by the
Supreme Court in creating and elaborating qualified immunity
doctrine.133 It is clearly designed to abolish the doctrine.
The near-term prospects for passage of the George Floyd
Act—or any similar proposal—are grim. Current Democratic
majorities are razor-thin in both houses, and the legislative
gauntlet any proposal must pass through is forbidding,
culminating in the sixty-vote threshold necessary to overcome
a Senate filibuster. But the Act’s passage in the House
demonstrates that police reform, including qualified immunity
reform, has become a central priority of the Democratic
coalition. This is a clear consequence of the massive popular
mobilization of 2020, and it significantly increases the
long-term odds of qualified immunity reform or abolition. In
the meantime, it is vital to ask what repeal or contraction of
qualified immunity will mean for constitutional tort litigation.
D.

Opening the Floodgates

Scholars and judges disagree about many aspects of this
question. Will scrapping qualified immunity deter unlawful
government conduct or over-deter lawful and socially beneficial
law enforcement activities? Will it have any deterrent effect at
all, in a world where virtually all law enforcement officers are
indemnified against personal liability? Will courts be less
willing to recognize new constitutional rights in a world where
government officials are strictly liable for their actions? There
is no consensus on any of these matters.134
On one point, however, both judges and scholars broadly
agree: abolition of qualified immunity is likely to lead to a
132. H.R. 1280 § 102.
133. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
should have known.”).
134. Compare Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 12, at
316–17, 351–52 (predicting no over-deterrence and no narrowing of
constitutional protections), with Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 62, at
938, 978 (predicting narrowing and possible over-deterrence).
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substantial increase in the volume of constitutional tort
suits.135 Indeed, protecting government officials against an
onslaught of frivolous litigation has long been a central and
explicit justification for the expansive version of qualified
immunity embodied in current judicial doctrine.136 Many
scholars disagree that the suits discouraged by qualified
immunity are frivolous, but there is little dispute that the
doctrine does, in fact, discourage constitutional tort filings.137
This consensus rests on a powerful and intuitive
theoretical foundation. As the case law currently stands,
qualified immunity is a substantial barrier to recovery for
many, if not all, constitutional tort plaintiffs. By many
accounts, that barrier is almost insurmountable.138 If this is
true, eliminating or weakening qualified immunity would
substantially increase the expected value of bringing a
constitutional tort suit. The effect seems likely to be especially
significant for fact-sensitive excessive force cases, where courts
have been especially exacting in their requirement that
plaintiffs point to a factually identical prior decision in order to
overcome qualified immunity.139 If the expected benefits of
filing constitutional tort suits increase while costs remain
constant, rational plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers will likely
file more constitutional tort suits. The bigger the increase in

135. See, e.g., Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 12, at 338
(“Doing away with qualified immunity will likely cause the total number of
cases filed to increase . . . .”).
136. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection
Effects, 114 NW. U.L. REV. 1101, 1152 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, Selection
Effects] (“To some lawyers, the challenges associated with qualified
immunity appear insurmountable.”); Katherine A. Macfarlane, Predicting
Utah v. Streiff’s Civil Rights Impact, 126 YALE L.J. F. 139, 144 (2016)
(describing qualified immunity as a “nearly insurmountable obstacle”).
139. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the
Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1887, 1899 (2018) (“Fourth Amendment
excessive force cases are inevitably fact specific. Thus, insisting on precedent
with the degree of particularity required by the Supreme Court in recent
cases means that many . . . plaintiffs with serious and substantial injuries
will be left without redress for actual constitutional violations . . . .”).
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expected benefit, the more filings should be expected to
increase.140
History seems to back up this hypothesis. In the aftermath
of Monroe v. Pape,141 which expanded the availability of civil
rights actions under § 1983, the volume of such cases
exploded.142 The same thing happened to the overall volume of
federal filings in the decades following the Warren Court’s
expansion of individual constitutional rights, particularly
rights of criminal defendants, along with the availability of
habeas corpus relief for violation of those rights.143 Of course,
many other changes occurred during this period, including
substantial population growth,144 multiplication of statutory
causes of action, and expansion of the federal administrative
state.145 But most observers agree that the exponential
increase in judicial caseloads was driven in significant part by
judicial decisions increasing the expected benefit of litigating

140. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 390 (2004) (“[S]uit is more likely the lower the cost of the suit, the
greater the likelihood of winning at trial, and the greater the plaintiff’s
award conditional on winning.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 9798 (1996) (discussing the effects of a decrease in
the real price of legal services on federal caseloads).
141. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
142. See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining
Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV.
533, 544 (2020) (“Especially important was Monroe v. Pape . . . . Since that
1961 decision, federal civil rights actions under § 1983 became a major part
of the work of the federal courts.”); Nielson & Walker, supra note 62, at
1870–71 (“Before Monroe v. Pape, § 1983 was remarkable for its
insignificance. Indeed, one commentator found only 21 suits brought under
this provision in the years between 1871 and 1920. After Monroe, by
contrast, there have been tens of thousands.” (internal quotation omitted)).
143. See, e.g., McAlister, supra note 142, at 543–44 (“Increased
litigiousness, coupled with Warren Court decisions that expanded criminal
and civil rights, also affected federal dockets.”).
144. See David Lam, How the World Survived the Population Bomb:
Lessons From 50 Years of Extraordinary Demographic History, 48
DEMOGRAPHY 1231, 1237 (2011) (“The 2% growth rates of the 1960s really
were a population explosion by historical standards, almost surely never seen
before and never to be seen again.”).
145. See McAlister, supra note 142, at 543–44 (explaining that, during
the Warren Court, Congress expanded federal jurisdiction over criminal and
civil matters, and the Court’s decisions “expanded criminal and civil rights”).
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constitutional claims.146 Abolishing or seriously curtailing
qualified immunity would represent far and away the most
significant pro-plaintiff change in the availability of relief
under § 1983 since Monroe.147 It would be quite surprising if
this change did not lead to a substantial increase in
constitutional tort filings.
This straightforward story comes with important caveats.
Qualified immunity is only one barrier among many that
reduce the expected benefits of bringing constitutional tort
suits. Hostile judges and juries, government-friendly
substantive law, lack of experienced counsel, lack of access to
essential evidence, and many other factors also come into
play.148 The abolition or limitation of qualified immunity would
do nothing to address these barriers to redress for
constitutional tort plaintiffs, which vary from one jurisdiction
to another and interact in complex ways.149 In some cases, and
perhaps many, this might be enough to tip the cost-benefit
balance against filing suit even in the absence of qualified
immunity. It is therefore difficult to estimate with confidence
how much abolition of the doctrine would increase the volume
of constitutional tort litigation.
Still, there is a strong theoretical and historical basis for
predicting that the effect on constitutional tort filings would be

146. See id. at 544 (explaining that “civil liability . . . for constitutional
violations by state actors” led to a dramatic growth in federal case filings and
appeals); POSNER, supra note 140, at 98 (“More important than any single
statute, however, has been the expansion of constitutional rights and
remedies.”).
147. Cf. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 12, at 360–61
(“[E]liminating qualified immunity will . . . clarify the law, reduce the cost
and complexity of civil rights litigation, increase the number of attorneys
willing to consider taking civil rights cases, and put an end to decisions
protecting officers who have clearly exceeded their constitutional
authority.”).
148. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV.
1539, 1543–44 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems]
(“[W]hether a civil rights lawsuit is filed and successful also depends on
myriad people, rules, and practices far beyond the purview of federal
judges . . . .”).
149. See id. at 1544–45 (“[S]ome civil rights ecosystems are friendlier to
civil rights suits than others. . . . As a result, a lawsuit concerning a
constitutional violation that would result in a substantial plaintiff’s victory
in one ecosystem might never be filed in another.”).
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positive and substantial. The limited available empirical
evidence specific to qualified immunity supports this
prediction. In two small, qualitative studies, a substantial
fraction of civil rights lawyers reported that qualified
immunity influenced their case-selection decisions, causing
them to turn down cases they would otherwise have taken.150
As Joanna Schwartz explains, this number is likely to
understate qualified immunity’s impact on constitutional tort
filings because it does not account for those lawyers whom
qualified immunity has completely driven out of the
constitutional tort business, a group she believes to be quite
large.151 This reinforces the theoretical and historical basis for
predicting that abolition of qualified immunity would
significantly increase the volume of constitutional tort
litigation.
This prediction has independent significance, whether or
not the anticipated flood of constitutional tort suits actually
materializes. If federal judges are persuaded that the abolition
of qualified immunity will have this result, as many of them
seem to be, there is a good chance they will act preemptively to
discourage the filing of new constitutional tort suits.152 Indeed,
if such preemptive action follows immediately in the wake of
qualified immunity’s abolition, we may never know how much
abolition would have increased the volume of litigation in a
world where all else was held constant.
The upshot is that judicial or legislative abolition of
qualified immunity is just the beginning. If advocates of
governmental accountability are to achieve their goals, they

150. See id. at 1155, 1169–78 tbl.7 (recounting that 11 out of 35
respondents reported that qualified immunity substantially influenced their
case-selection decisions, including one who quit civil rights practice
altogether in response to qualified immunity); Alexander Reinert, Does
Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 494 (2011) (“[M]ost
attorneys seem to select cases to avoid any possible qualified immunity
issues arising in the litigation.”).
151. See id. at 1148 (“I found a great deal of evidence to suggest that the
challenges of civil rights litigation—including qualified immunity—may have
caused lawyers to decrease the number of civil rights cases they take or stop
taking these cases at all.”).
152. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV.
782, 826 (2011) (“[E]ven if litigation incentives do not in fact increase the
number of claims filed, judges may believe that they do.”).
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must look ahead to the actual and perceived judicial capacity
problems that abolition is likely to create. Otherwise, the
triumph of formally abolishing qualified immunity may well
prove short-lived. The stakes are extremely high.
This is not merely a matter of judicial preference for
greater leisure or prioritizing administrative economy over
substantive justice. Like any other institution, the federal
judiciary has limited capacity. As Marin Levy has aptly put it,
judicial attention is a “scarce resource.”153 There are only so
many federal judges and law clerks and so many hours in a
day. Even at the present volume of litigation, it is impossible
for the federal courts to accord every case on their dockets the
oral argument, extensive consideration by Article III judges,
and published precedential opinions that American judicial
norms have historically promised.154 Some form of triage or
rationing of scarce judicial resources is unavoidable.155
With each new increase in the volume of federal litigation,
the need for such measures becomes more acute. As judges
look to manage the strain, the influx of new cases that is
forcing their hand constitutes a highly salient and
ready-at-hand target for second-class treatment, especially
when judges are predisposed to be skeptical of the cases in
question. If this is how federal courts respond to a new wave of
constitutional tort filings, virtually every potential benefit of
abolishing qualified immunity will be in jeopardy. In
particular, constitutional tort suits will be far less likely to
deter unlawful government conduct or to make the victims of
such conduct whole if federal courts treat them as a threat to

153. Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A
Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 407 (2013) [hereinafter Levy,
Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource].
154. See id. at 414–15 (explaining that judges have increased the use of
unpublished opinions, decreased the availability of oral argument, and
increasingly leaned on staff attorney offices to deal with rising caseloads).
155. See id. at 414 (“Because judges cannot formally alter the relevant
court constraints, they have found ways to work within them. Specifically,
judges have created several practices for deciding cases more
quickly—practices that come at the expense of the traditional model of
appellate decisionmaking.”); see generally WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM
M. RICHMAN, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN
CRISIS (2013); POSNER, supra note 140.
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their dockets, rather than a core element of their judicial
responsibility. This makes it essential to understand the
nature and limits of federal-court capacity, the tools available
to courts for managing increasing demands on that capacity,
and
the
mechanisms
for
influencing
these
capacity-management decisions. To that task, we now turn.
II.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND SUPREME COURT CAPACITY

How will the federal judiciary cope with a substantial
influx of new constitutional tort suits unleashed by the
abolition of qualified immunity? The answer to this question
begins with recognizing that the federal judiciary, like
Congress, is a “they,” not an “it.”156 Historically, most
discussion of qualified immunity has focused on the Supreme
Court. It is the Supreme Court that read qualified immunity
into § 1983.157 It is the Supreme Court that extended qualified
immunity even to government officers acting in bad faith.158 It
is the Supreme Court that defined “clearly established law” to
require plaintiffs to identify judicial decisions involving nearly
identical facts in order to overcome qualified immunity.159 And
it is the Supreme Court that has recently ratcheted up review
of apparently routine lower-court decisions denying qualified
immunity, often reversing such decisions unanimously.160 One
leading academic commentator has gone so far as to argue that
156. See Shepsle, supra note 16, at 254 (coining this phrase).
157. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (“We hold that the
defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found
available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and
imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 1983.”).
158. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore
hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
should have known.”).
159. See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (“While this Court’s
case law do[es] not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly
established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate. In other words, immunity protects all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
(alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted)).
160. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 245 (2009); Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768 (2014).
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this pattern of decisions is best explained by judicial capacity
concerns.161
Yet, as this Part explains, eliminating qualified immunity
poses no meaningful threat to the Supreme Court’s limited
capacity. The real judicial capacity threat is to the lower
courts, who lack the Supreme Court’s discretionary control
over their dockets and will therefore be compelled to respond to
any substantial increase in the volume of constitutional tort
litigation with some form of triage or rationing. The Supreme
Court might or might not step in to help the lower courts
manage their judicial capacity problems, but it is those
problems, and not any strain on the Supreme Court itself, that
will dominate Round Two of the battle over qualified
immunity. This Part explains why.
A.

The Standard Account

Most explanatory accounts of qualified immunity center on
judicial ideology.162 This is a familiar story. Over the past fifty
years, the Supreme Court has become steadily more
conservative and steadily more hostile to the kinds of rights
most commonly asserted in constitutional tort litigation and
the predominantly poor, marginalized claimants most likely
bring such suits. From state sovereign immunity,163 to habeas
corpus,164 to the Fourth Amendment,165 to pleading
161. See Huq, supra note 4, at 25 (“[W]hereas the overdeterrence-related
justification for qualified immunity rests on elusive, and perhaps false,
empirical supposition, the judicial-economy justification for qualified
immunity is both immediately clear and obviously true.”).
162. See, e.g., id. at 49 (noting and rejecting this commonplace view).
163. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996)
(“Here . . . we have found that Congress does not have authority under the
Constitution to make the State suable in federal court . . . .”); Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (“[T]o authorize private
individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a
pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .).
164. See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267 (2015) (finding that a
prisoner is only entitled to denying habeas corpus relief because error was
harmless); White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014) (denying habeas
corpus relief because the state supreme court’s holding was not “objectively
unreasonable”).
165. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009) (holding
that police “negligence . . . [unlike] systemic error or reckless disregard of
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standards,166 to justiciability,167 the Court has made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to get in the courthouse door and more
difficult for them to prevail when they do.168 The expansion of
qualified immunity is of a piece with this broader trend. It is
also of a piece with the Court’s increasing solicitude for the
interest of law enforcement at the expense of individual liberty
and equality claims, particularly by members of marginalized
groups.169 In many of these areas, the Court’s decisions
consistently break down along conventional ideological lines,
with conservative Justices voting in favor of the government
and liberal Justices voting in favor of the individuals asserting
constitutional liberty and equality claims.170
Many of the arguments advanced by the Justices and their
academic defenders are consistent with this conventional
wisdom. Perhaps the main concern evinced by the Court’s
qualified immunity decisions is that strict liability for
constitutional torts would over-deter socially beneficial law
enforcement activity.171 The idea is that government officials in
general and law enforcement officers in particular do not
constitutional requirements” does not automatically require suppression of
evidence); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that
pretextual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment).
166. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)
(replacing notice pleading with “plausibility” requirement); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009) (reaffirming this shift).
167. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013)
(requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate an actual or “certainly impending” injury
to establish Article III standing); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
488, 496 (2009) (plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge only those
applications of a law or regulation that directly affect them).
168. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR:
HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017)
(recounting this trend).
169. See Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal
Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1565, 1569–70 (2013) (discussing the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’
treatment of “discrete and insular minorities” who received heightened
protection by the Warren and Burger Courts).
170. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 665 (breaking down along ideological
lines); Clapper, 568 U.S. at 400 (same); Herring, 555 U.S. at 136 (same).
171. See Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 62, at 989 (“In Harlow and
ever since, the Court’s shaping of immunity standards has relied on the
assumption that fear of personal liability would have undesirable chilling
effects on officials threatened with suit.”).
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internalize—that is, personally benefit from—the social gains
they generate by doing their jobs zealously.172 If these officials
were held personally liable for the costs of doing their jobs
zealously, they would be likely to err on the side of caution, to
the detriment of society as a whole.173
The Court’s qualified immunity decisions show far less
solicitude for the individuals deprived of their constitutional
rights by over-zealous law enforcement or the injustice of
requiring these individuals to bear the entire cost of unlawful
government conduct that supposedly benefits everyone.174 The
notion that these losses should simply lie where they fall is
consistent with a conservative worldview that valorizes law
enforcement and has little sympathy for the poor and
marginalized groups that most often find themselves caught up
in its gears. Many observers, inside and outside the academy,
have taken qualified immunity to be the straightforward
embodiment of just such a view.175
B.

Huq’s Judicial Capacity Thesis

In an important recent article, Aziz Huq challenges this
conventional wisdom with an alternative theory of qualified

172. See Jeffries, supra note 62, at 244 (“The argument [for qualified
immunity] is essentially . . . that the prospect of civil liability will induce
timidity and caution in the exercise of government powers that generally
operate to the public good.”).
173. See, e.g., id.; Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra
note 53, at 1806 (“In its most recent decisions, the Court focuses primarily on
qualified immunity’s presumed ability to shield government officials from
burdens associated with discovery and trial.”).
174. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–72 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (condemning the majority’s dismissal of the real-world impact of
unlawful police conduct).
175. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 168, at 5 (“[Q]ualified
immunity . . . . mean[s] that people whose rights have been violated and who
have suffered great injuries, including even fatal ones, are left without
recourse.”); Smith, supra note 63, at 2103 (noting “scant attention paid to
whether a victim of unconstitutional conduct will see any kind of remedy”);
David H. Gans, The Fourteenth Amendment Was Meant to Be a Protection
Against State Violence, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y99LVTBM (“The Supreme Court has betrayed the promise of equal citizenship by
allowing police to arrest and kill Americans at will.”).
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immunity focused on judicial capacity.176 While not denying the
role of ideology in judicial decision-making, Huq argues that
judicial independence also frees the Supreme Court to pursue
non-ideological institutional interests.177 In particular, he
suggests insulation from political accountability gives the
Court space to discourage cases that would significantly add to
its workload.178 He thinks that this institutional concern is the
best explanation for the Court’s qualified immunity decisions
and its broader embrace of fault standards across Fourth
Amendment suppression proceedings and habeas corpus
review of state criminal convictions.179
Building on familiar rational-actor models of litigation,
Huq posits that qualified immunity should significantly reduce
the volume of constitutional tort litigation by reducing the
expected value of bringing a constitutional tort suit.180 If most
potential constitutional tort claims will be dismissed on
grounds of qualified immunity, plaintiffs and their attorneys
have far less incentive to file them in the first place. Qualified
immunity is obviously not the only tool courts might use to
achieve this end, but Huq notes that it is a familiar one in the
common-law tradition.181 And many alternative tools would
likely have been unattractive to the Justices for ideological
reasons.182
This may be enough to make judicial capacity a possible
explanation for the expansion and present contours of qualified
immunity doctrine, but Huq recognizes that more is necessary
to render it plausible, much less probable. To that end, he
points to two principal types of evidence. The first is the
absence of sharp ideological division in most of the Supreme

176. See Huq, supra note 4, at 25 (“[W]hereas the overdeterrence-related
justification for qualified immunity rests on elusive, and perhaps false,
empirical supposition, the judicial-economy justification for qualified
immunity is both immediately clear and obviously true.”).
177. See id. at 40 (arguing that the Court’s judicial capacity concerns
about qualified immunity find “at least some causal foundation in the
institutional independence of the federal judiciary”).
178. Id. at 56.
179. Id. at 33.
180. Id. at 49.
181. Id. at 61.
182. Id. at 62.
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Court’s qualified immunity decisions, at least until recently:
“Today, the majority of applications of qualified immunity
elicit not just a majority, but unanimity, from the Court.”183
Second, he points to many express statements by Justices
across the political spectrum linking qualified immunity to a
concern with caseload management, which he contends should
be taken as genuine.184 Summing up, Huq concludes: Supreme
Court Justices “have since the 1950s repeatedly articulated
their resistance to constitutional remediation in terms of the
judiciary’s institutional interest in caseload management.”185
Huq’s account is eminently plausible and a useful
corrective to one-dimensional attitudinalist accounts of
Supreme Court decision-making. But we believe it requires two
friendly amendments. First, prioritizing caseload management
over the constitutional rights of § 1983 plaintiffs and
deterrence of unlawful government conduct is itself an
ideological decision, as well as an institutional one. This is not
to dispute the inevitability of judicial rationing in a world of
scarce resources. But the Supreme Court has many levers at
its disposal for conserving those resources. Its decision to
discourage the filing of constitutional tort suits through an
expansive qualified immunity doctrine suggests that it sees
these suits as less worthy of judicial attention than others.
That is an ideological judgment, even if it commands
assent from some or all of the liberal justices. A differently
composed Supreme Court—or a Court awakened to greater
consciousness of systemic inequality—might choose to allocate
judicial resources quite differently. This recognition becomes
crucial when we think about how the federal courts will
manage the strain on their limited capacity that is likely to
follow abolition of qualified immunity. The question is not
whether courts make resource-conscious decisions. It is what
priorities those decisions reflect.
That brings us to our second friendly amendment: The
capacity of the federal judiciary is not an undifferentiated
183. Id. at 48.
184. See id. at 52 (“Although ideology has certainly been salient, it does
not capture the whole story: Justices repeatedly emphasize caseload and
judicial-economy concerns in regard to habeas, suppression remedies, and
constitutional tort.”).
185. Id. at 60.
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whole. In particular, it is crucially important to distinguish
between the capacity of the lower federal courts and the
capacity of the Supreme Court. For understandable reasons,
Huq gives the great bulk of his attention to the latter.186 But
the judicial capacity crunch likely to follow abolition of
qualified immunity will occur predominantly, if not
exclusively, in the lower courts. To think clearly about how
courts might respond and what strategies outside actors might
employ to influence that response, it is necessary to
understand
why
lower-court—but
not
Supreme
Court—capacity is the central issue. The next sub-Part
explains.
C.

Normal vs. Capacity-Constrained Domains

In the most obvious sense, the capacity of the U.S.
Supreme Court is far smaller than the capacity of the lower
federal courts. The lower courts decide several hundred
thousand cases a year.187 The Supreme Court currently decides
fewer than seventy-five.188 It could certainly decide more than
that, but most scholars doubt it could decide more than 150 or
at most 200 cases per year without seriously sacrificing
professional standards.189 For this reason, the Supreme Court
is frequently described as a bottleneck atop the
pyramid-shaped judicial hierarchy, limiting the capacity of the
federal judiciary as a whole.190
186. See generally Huq, supra note 4.
187. See Federal Caseload Statistics 2020, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/B28N-57T2 (reporting that U.S. District Courts received
425,945 filings and U.S. Courts of Appeals received 50,258 filings).
188. See, e.g., Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 865.
189. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (1987) (“[T]he Justices have
only 150 full opportunities yearly to carry out their function. No one suggests
this number could be increased very much.”); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
268 (2006) (“The Court’s peak capacity runs to about 200 cases per
year . . . .”).
190. See COAN, supra note 14, at 13 (“The theory is that having just one
court at the apex of the system, just one court that possesses authority to
make nationally binding decisions of federal law, creates a kind of
bottleneck.”); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
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This description captures something important, but it also
overlooks a crucial distinction between the Supreme Court and
lower courts that cuts decidedly the opposite way. Because the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is almost wholly discretionary,
the Court is free to hear as many or as few cases as the
Justices choose.191 This is absolutely essential to
understanding the Court’s capacity. A couple of silly examples
help to illustrate the point:
First, if the Justices were so inclined, they could simply
grant the first fifty petitions for certiorari they receive each
year and deny all the rest. For a variety of reasons, it is
inconceivable that the Court would ever adopt this policy. But
if it did, the Justices’ workload would be entirely independent
of the overall volume of federal litigation. That volume could
double or triple without taxing the Supreme Court’s capacity in
the slightest.192 This is not so different from the real world
where there is no strong or obvious relation between the
volume of federal litigation and the size of the Supreme Court’s
docket.193 The Justices decide significantly fewer cases today
than they did in the early 1960s when the total volume of
federal litigation was dramatically lower.194
Second, if the Justices were willing to decide cases by coin
flip or random computer algorithm, they could grant every
petition they received—including the wave of new petitions
that this policy would trigger—without breaking a sweat. More
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 40–41 (2001) (describing how the appellate
hierarchy limits capacity).
191. About the Supreme Court, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/5M9F-CXA3 (“The Certiorari Act of 1925 gives the Court the
discretion to decide whether or not to [hear a case].”).
192. Cf. COAN, supra note 14, at 1314 (“If the justices were so inclined,
they could decide cases by coin flip instead of by briefing and oral
argument”).
193. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 865 (charting the falling
Supreme Court caseload during period of rising lower court caseloads).
194. See id.; REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 6 (“[I]n 1960, there
were 57 filings per judgeship, and today there are 327 filings per judgeship;
in the intervening fifty years, judicial workload has increased by nearly 600
percent!”); Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note 153, at
407 (“In 1950, the average annual filings per active judge was only
seventy-three cases, which mean that courts could hold oral argument,
consider the merits of each case in chambers, and publish full-length
opinions in every matter.”).
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plausibly, the Court could achieve nearly the same result by
substantially expanding its staff and delegating much greater
authority to low-level bureaucrats.195 Again, it is virtually
inconceivable that the Justices would ever adopt these policies,
but there is nothing inherent in the structure of the Supreme
Court or the federal judiciary that would prevent it from doing
so.196
The upshot is not that the Supreme Court’s capacity is
unlimited. It is that the limits of that capacity come mostly
from the norms governing the Court’s certiorari and case
handling practices rather than institutional structure,
resources, or the Justices’ limited time.197 Specifically, the
number of cases the Court is capable of hearing per term is
limited by the Justices’ commitment to certain minimum
professional standards in case handling, including oral
argument, extensive written briefing, extensive written
opinions, and extensive direct involvement by the Justices
themselves.198 This commitment is so long-standing and widely
shared as to be almost invisible.199 It is also extremely unlikely
to change any time soon.200 For these reasons, it is fair to say
that the Court is capable of hearing no more than 150 or at
most 200 hundred cases per term. This number is substantially
more than the Court’s current norm, but quite small relative to
the total volume of federal litigation.201
Even so, if the Court felt free to deny certiorari
indiscriminately, this upper limit on the Court’s capacity
would leave the Justices effectively immune against increases
in the volume of federal litigation. But of course, the Court
does not feel free in this regard. In most areas, it is happy to
allow lower courts to have the final word in the vast majority
of cases, reviewing at most a tiny fraction of their decisions to
195. COAN, supra note 14, at 14.
196. See id. (“[T]he hierarchical structure of the judicial system . . . alone
cannot explain the limited capacity of the judiciary.”).
197. See id. at 14–18 (describing how the Court’s norms influence—and
limit—its capacity).
198. Id. at 14.
199. See id. at 17 (explaining that it would be “unthinkable that any
Justice today” would significantly depart from these norms).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 16.
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ensure national uniformity and compliance with Supreme
Court precedent.202 But in many of the most important areas of
constitutional law, especially those implicating the validity of
many federal statutes, the Court feels compelled to review a
much higher fraction of lower court decisions. In particular, it
feels compelled to review virtually every lower court decision
invalidating a federal statute.203 This constraint starkly limits
the volume of federal litigation the Justices can invite in these
domains without overwhelming their limited capacity.204
Examples include the commerce power, the spending power,
the nondelegation doctrine, presidential administration, equal
protection, and regulatory takings.205
Each of these “capacity-constrained” domains has the
potential to affect the validity of hundreds or thousands of
federal statutes with tens or hundreds of thousands of
individual provisions.206 Each of these domains also affects the
interests of well-organized and well-financed groups with both
the incentive and the resources to mount sophisticated legal
challenges to federal legislation.207 And if the Supreme Court
interpreted the relevant constitutional provisions to invite
such challenges, the Justices themselves would feel compelled
to review a large fraction of the resulting litigation. The
potential volume of litigation in even one of these domains
would be enough to overwhelm the Court’s capacity of 150 to
200 cases per year. To avoid this result, the Justices have
consistently employed a combination of broad deference to the
political process and hard-edged categorical rules.208 The
former reduces the expected benefits of bringing suit and the
202. Id. at 2223; see also Coan, supra note 17, at 428 n.15 (“[T]he Court
is much more willing to tolerate disuniformity in lower court invalidations of
state and local laws, the interpretation (as opposed to invalidation) of federal
statutes, the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, etc.”).
203. COAN, supra note 14, at 29 n.14 (collecting sources).
204. Id. at 29.
205. See generally id. (canvassing each of these domains to illustrate how
judicial capacity shapes Supreme Court decision-making).
206. See generally id. See also Coan, supra note 17, at 436–37 (“A robust
reading of either the Equal Protection Clause or the Takings Clause,
articulated in the form of a vague standard, would imperil half the U.S.
Code.”).
207. See generally COAN, supra note 14.
208. See generally id.
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latter reduces the risk of disuniformity in the lower courts and
increases the chances of settlement.209
As we mentioned above, most domains are not
capacity-constrained in this sense. In these “normal domains,”
the Supreme Court feels compelled to grant review in only a
tiny fraction of cases, if that.210 For this reason, the volume of
federal litigation in these domains has no meaningful impact
on the Court’s workload. As a result, concerns for its own
limited capacity impose virtually no constraint on the Court’s
ability or willingness to invite an increased volume of litigation
by increasing the expected benefits of filing suit.211 A good
recent example is the series of recent Supreme Court decisions
holding federal sentencing laws unconstitutionally vague.212
Because these decisions apply retroactively to final convictions,
they have produced tens of thousands of additional filings in
the lower courts.213 But the Supreme Court has decided only a
small handful of these cases over the course of five years,
barely a blip on its radar screen.
Other normal domains include federal habeas corpus relief
for state prisoners, the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination, and the Sixth
Amendment’s jury-trial and confrontation clauses. In all of
209. Id. at 23–24; see KOMESAR, supra note 190, at 160 (“These simple
rules reduce uncertainty about adjudicative outcomes, facilitate settlements,
and allow courts to allocate decision making elsewhere, thereby sharing
responsibility with other institutions.”); POSNER, supra note 140, at 369
(“Because a rule is more definite, its adoption will increase legal certainty
and so reduce the amount of litigation, and will also make each lawsuit
simpler and shorter . . . .”).
210. See supra note 18.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015)
(concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) is unconstitutionally vague); Welch
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016) (holding that Johnson applies
retroactively); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018) (concluding
that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Davis,
139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is
unconstitutionally vague”).
213. U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2016, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE
U.S. CTS., https://perma.cc/NDQ2-PESJ (noting a 350 percent rise in motions
to vacate sentences following the Court’s decisions in Welch and Johnson);
U.S. Courts of Appeals—Judicial Business 2016, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S.
CTS., https://perma.cc/MHG4-7EQH (same).
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these domains, the Court has, at some point in the past seven
decades, expanded constitutional protections or access to a
federal judicial remedy in ways that substantially increased
the expected benefits of filing suit.214 In each case, a
substantial volume of new litigation has ensued.215 But as with
the Court’s recent criminal sentencing decisions, the Justices
themselves have never felt obliged to review more than a
handful of the resulting cases per term.216
Notwithstanding the Court’s recent practice of
aggressively reviewing and reversing routine lower-court
decisions, qualified immunity falls into the same category. No
increase in the volume of constitutional tort cases that it
currently discourages would impose even a trivial strain on the
Supreme Court’s limited capacity. As in other normal domains,
the Court is and always has been quite content to allow lower
courts to have the final word in the vast majority of these
cases.217 The main reason for this is that constitutional tort
suits nearly always involve the actions of individual executive
officials, rather than the constitutional validity of federal
laws.218 Actions brought under § 1983, which constitute the
great bulk of suits in which qualified immunity arises, never
214. See generally Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (dramatically
expanding the availability of federal habeas corpus review of state criminal
convictions); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing a new
right to a detailed verbal warning of the Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent and Sixth Amendment right to counsel before custodial police
interrogations). See also COAN, supra note 14, at 158 (noting that the Court is
content to leave the “vast majority” of lower court decisions in habeas corpus
reviews, Fourth Amendment cases, and Title VII cases unreviewed); BRIAN R.
MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 4:6 (2021) (summarizing the historical
expansion of constitutional protections under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments).
215. See, e.g., Coan, supra note 17, at 438 (“[T]he constitutional rights
revolution of the 1950s and 1960s . . . generated an enormous volume of new
litigation.”).
216. Id.
217. Compare Federal Caseload Statistics 2020, supra note 187 (stating
that the federal judiciary’s caseload numbers in the hundreds of thousands),
with Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 865 (stating that the Supreme Court
heard fewer than seventy-five cases in its last term).
218. See Coan, supra note 17, at 436 (noting that the Supreme Court is
generally “toleran[t] of disuniformity” involving “challenges to executive
action, rather than legislation, and especially to executive action at the state
and local levels”).
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involve the constitutional validity of federal laws because they
can only be brought against persons acting “under color of”
state law.219 Thus, even if the abolition or limitation of
qualified immunity triggers a flood of new litigation, the
Supreme Court will feel nothing like the pressure it feels in
capacity-constrained domains to safeguard its own limited
capacity.
D.

Rescuing the Lower Courts

This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court will
necessarily be unmoved by the prospect of a major increase in
constitutional tort filings. The Court might be troubled by this
prospect, and take steps to counteract it, for ideological
reasons. The Court might also worry about the impact of a new
influx of cases on already overburdened lower courts. As Marin
Levy and Aziz Huq have documented, Supreme Court opinions
frequently express judicial capacity concerns, sometimes
opportunistically but often with apparent sincerity.220 A
generalized concern with reasonably timely and efficient access
to the court system is one of the deeply rooted professional
norms widely embraced by American judges.221
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
220. See Huq, supra note 4, at 28 (“This is . . . one of the rare instances in
which one need not guess at the Court’s attention to its own institutional
concerns. They are explicit on the surface of its opinions.”); Levy, Judging the
Flood of Litigation, supra note 14, at 1012
[T]he justices occasionally suggest or even hold that a new cause
of action must go unrecognized, or a case unreviewed, because to
do otherwise would invite too many new filings into the federal
courts. More frequently, the majority asserts that its holding is
sound because it will not lead to an increase in claims, or the
dissent accuses the majority of being improperly motivated by a
desire to avoid such an increase.
221. See Coan, supra note 17, at 429 (describing the “widely shared
judicial commitment to timely and efficient access to the legal system”);
POSNER, supra note 140, at 128
[T]he people who control the federal court system . . . have acted
consistently as if they had an unshakable commitment to
accommodating any increase in the demand for federal judicial
services without raising the price of those services, directly (as by
filing fees) or indirectly (as by imposing delay), in the short run or
the long run . . . .
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Yet in each of the normal domains discussed above, the
Supreme Court has been perfectly willing to reshape legal
doctrine in ways that triggered a large volume of new litigation
in the lower courts.222 In some of these examples, the Court has
subsequently retrenched in ways that reduced the expected
value of filing suit, perhaps partially out of concern for
lower-court workloads.223 But often, this has taken decades,
and it has by no means been the Court’s universal practice. If
lower-court workloads struck anything like the same chord
with the Justices as their own capacity limits, the Court’s
response to the caseload crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, which
has never truly abated, would have been far more robust than
it was.224
For all of these reasons, it is no sure thing that the
Supreme Court will respond at all to a substantial increase in
new constitutional tort suits triggered by the abolition or
limitation of qualified immunity. At least in part, this will
likely depend on whether the fate of qualified immunity is
decided by the Court itself or legislated by Congress. If the
latter, a majority of Justices may be more prone to see the
resulting strain on lower-court dockets as an outside
imposition to be resisted.225 If the former, a majority of Justices
may have come around to a more favorable view of
constitutional tort suits, at least partly in response to recent
events and the cultural changes they have unleashed.226 Either
way, if the Court chooses to limit the volume of constitutional
litigation, it has a wide variety of tools at its disposal.
These tools can be roughly broken down into two
categories: substantive and procedural. By making substantive
law less friendly to constitutional tort plaintiffs, in general or
222. See supra notes 212216 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Coan, supra note 17, at 439 n.47 (“[T]he Court’s retreat
from many of these rights in subsequent decades should probably not be
understood as compelled by the limits of judicial capacity. Capacity may have
been one factor, but it was hardly the only one, as evidenced by the
willingness of most liberal justices to stay the course.”).
224. See id.
225. Cf. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1647–48 (1995)
(describing the ways in which the legislative branch can influence the Court’s
judicial capacity budget).
226. See supra Part I.C.3.
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in particular domains, the Supreme Court could reduce the
expected value of bringing constitutional tort suits,
neutralizing the effect of qualified immunity’s abolition on
plaintiffs’ incentive to litigate.227 Even if no Justice consciously
sets out to achieve this goal, a general sense that plaintiffs are
winning too many suits of this type in the lower courts could
predispose some or all of the conservative Justices to pare back
substantive constitutional rights as a compensatory
adjustment.228
The same goes for procedural tools, which encompass
pleading standards, discovery rules, summary judgment
standards, justiciability doctrine, and the like.229 These are
somewhat
cruder
instruments
because
they
apply
trans-substantively to all civil litigation and not just to
constitutional tort suits, though courts frequently appear to
manipulate them according to their views of the merits.230 In
any case, these procedural tools work by the same essential
mechanism as narrowing of substantive constitutional rights.
They reduce the expected value of filing constitutional tort
suits.231
Taken far enough, either or both of these tools could
effectively recreate qualified immunity by another name. To be
more precise, they could place constitutional tort plaintiffs as a

227. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 147 (1997) (“[T]he
courts can reduce the number of requests that they review governmental
activity by setting out standards that increase the deference given to the
reviewed entity.”).
228. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 152, at 836 (“[I]t should come as no
surprise if the judges who are unsympathetic to the substantive rights that
Congress has sought to promote through litigation incentives, and who are
therefore likely to resent an increase in the number of claims filed, largely
fall right of center.”).
229. COAN, supra note 14, at 21–22.
230. See Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 62, at 958 (arguing that
Iqbal was “not . . . distinctively applicable to constitutional tort actions,” but
it was “clearly crafted . . . with Bivens and § 1983 suits in mind”); see also
Lemos, supra note 152, at 830 (“As Iqbal makes clear, Twombly’s new rule
applies to all categories of federal civil litigation, making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to get through the courthouse door.”).
231. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 152, at 828–30 (detailing the Court’s
procedural methods of “reduc[ing] the value, and hence the likely effect, of
litigation incentives”).
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class in roughly the same position they occupied under
qualified immunity, which is to say, the position they occupy
now. Roughly and as a class are important qualifiers. No
package of compensating substantive and procedural
adjustments is likely to disadvantage precisely the same
plaintiffs in precisely the same ways as qualified immunity.
The burden will fall more heavily on some classes of
constitutional claims than others and may also discriminate in
more subtle ways. For instance, the importance of precisely
analogous prior precedent may diminish, while proof of
subjective bad faith or access to documentary evidence
increases.232
It is even possible that a package of compensating
adjustments could make constitutional tort plaintiffs worse off
overall. The civil litigation system is not a marvel of modern
engineering, manufactured to exacting tolerances and capable
of infinitely precise calibration. It is an enormously messy and
complex concatenation of dynamic forces, interacting in
manifold ways—an ecosystem, to return to Joanna Schwartz’s
helpful metaphor.233 Even if a majority of Justices consciously
set out to perfectly offset the impact of qualified immunity’s
abolition, the tools at their disposal are far too crude to achieve
this objective except by dumb luck. If the Court is instead
reacting instinctively out of a gut sense that too many
constitutional tort suits are straining lower court dockets, it is
even more likely to over-shoot its mark.
This worst-case scenario is possible but highly speculative,
as is the prospect of the Supreme Court making compensating
adjustments of any kind to offset an influx of new
constitutional tort cases. For two decades, scholarly defenders
of qualified immunity have been warning that the doctrine is
but one component of a delicate equilibrium.234 Without it,
232. See generally Schwartz, Selection Effects, supra note 138 (explaining
the many ways that qualified immunity influences which cases are brought).
233. See Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, supra note 148, at 1547–48
(“Instead of the animals, plants, and abiotic elements that populate natural
ecosystems, litigation ecosystems are made up of interconnected and
interacting causes of action, substantive and procedural rules, attorneys,
judges, and juries.”).
234. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About
Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480 (2011) [hereinafter Fallon,
Asking the Right Questions] (“[S]ubstantive rights, causes of action to enforce
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courts might be more reluctant to recognize new constitutional
rights or more likely to restrict justiciability or pleading
standards to the detriment of constitutional tort plaintiffs.235
Instead, as Leah Litman has pointed out, all of these doctrines
have grown more stringent—that is, friendlier to defendants
and more hostile to plaintiffs—at the same time.236
This is not to discount the equilibration thesis entirely. It
is empirically plausible that various procedural and remedial
doctrines work in tandem to determine the social impact of
constitutional litigation and that judges are at least dimly
aware of this fact.237 It is also normatively plausible that
judges should consider the interplay between these doctrines
when calibrating each of them to optimize the overall impact of
their decisions.238 But this empirical claim is nothing like an
rights, rules of pleading and proof, and immunity doctrines all are flexible
and potentially adjustable components of a package of rights and
enforcement mechanisms that should be viewed, and assessed for
desirability, as a whole.”).
235. See, e.g., id.; Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 62, at 968 (noting
that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), might have been decided differently if they
included damages claims); Jeffries, supra note 62, at 247 (“Limitations on
money damages facilitate constitutional evolution and growth by reducing
the cost of innovation.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889–90 (1999) [hereinafter
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration] (similar).
236. See Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 1477, 1483 (2018) (describing the “demanding,” “stringent,” and
“narrow” standards for plaintiffs established by the Supreme Court); see also
Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 53, at 1815
(“[T]he Court’s qualified immunity decisions have nevertheless made it
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to show that defendants have violated
clearly established law, and increasingly easy for courts to avoid defining the
contours of constitutional rights.”); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified
Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 705
(2009) (finding that qualified immunity did not encourage judges to recognize
new constitutional rights in cases where courts decided the merits before
deciding qualified immunity).
237. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and
Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633,
684–85 (2006) [hereinafter Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and
Remedies] (detailing the empirical evidence behind the equilibration thesis).
238. See Fallon, Asking the Right Questions, supra note 234, at 485 (“[A]s
the Supreme Court’s historical pattern of doctrinal adjustment helps to
establish, role-based obligations by no means eliminate the Justices’ capacity
and indeed their obligation to exercise reasoned judgment in pursuit of a
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ironclad law. As the examples above illustrate, the Supreme
Court quite frequently changes constitutional doctrine to
increase the expected benefits of filing suit without making
compensating adjustments. And normatively, it will often be
the case that current equilibrium is suboptimal and that
adjusting a single one of its doctrinal elements—like qualified
immunity—will change it for the better.
For all of these reasons, advocates of governmental
accountability should pay close attention to the Supreme
Court’s response to the influx of constitutional litigation
triggered by qualified immunity’s demise. The Court
sometimes acts to protect the lower courts against perceived
docket pressures in ways that could have a profoundly negative
impact on constitutional tort plaintiffs. But very often, the
Justices are inattentive, if not deliberately indifferent, to the
capacity problems of lower courts. It is therefore quite likely
that those courts will be left to manage the aftermath of
qualified immunity on their own. The next Part explores how
they might do so and how their options differ from the
Supreme Court’s.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND LOWER-COURT CAPACITY
For the lower courts, unlike the Supreme Court,
inattention and indifference are not an option. When cases
arrive on their dockets, they must dispose of them. And unlike
the Supreme Court, which is operating well below its
maximum capacity, the lower federal courts have been laboring
under a “crisis of volume” for decades.239 That crisis has shown
some signs of plateauing in recent years, but plateauing is not
the same as abating. With some variation across circuits and
districts, the caseload of the lower courts remains
astronomically high.240 To manage their overcrowded dockets,
well-designed overall alignment of rights, justiciability doctrines, causes of
action, and immunity doctrines.”).
239. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 813, 843 (describing the
consensus that lower courts have been “in or near” a caseload crisis for the
past half century); see generally Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce
Resource, supra note 153 (same); REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155
(same).
240. See generally Menell & Vacca, supra note 26 (canvassing the data);
Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note 153 (same).
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these courts have had no choice but to ration the
administration of justice in various significant ways. These
include limiting the use of oral argument and published
opinions, greater reliance on staff attorneys, declining reversal
rates, and much more.241 This Part explains why the judicial
capacity constraints on lower courts are so different from those
operating on the Supreme Court. It then canvasses the varied
tools those courts have used to manage their overcrowded
dockets and the two-track system of justice that this has
produced. The next Part explains the implications for
constitutional litigation after qualified immunity and what
might be done to address them.
A.

Judicial Capacity and Judicial Hierarchy

There are two major differences between the lower courts
and the Supreme Court with regard to judicial capacity. The
first is that the lower courts are courts of mandatory, rather
than discretionary, jurisdiction.242 The second is that the lower
courts must work within the bounds of Supreme Court
precedent, while the Justices are free to reverse or revise their
own prior decisions.243 Together, these differences make the
judicial capacity challenges facing lower courts far more
complicated than those facing the Supreme Court.
The crux of the problem is simple. Both the federal district
courts and the federal courts of appeal are obligated to decide
every case presented to them that falls within their
jurisdiction.244 Yet there are only so many judges, each of
whom employs only a small handful of clerks. And each judge
at both the district and appellate court levels is responsible for

241. See infra Part III.B.1.
242. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
243. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“[U]nless we wish
anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this
Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided
the judges of those courts may think it to be.”).
244. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal:
Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts
of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 367 (2005) (“In the federal system, the
courts of appeals have mandatory jurisdiction over appeals from district
courts; thus, they must decide all cases properly brought to them.”).
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hundreds of cases per year.245 Not all cases are created equal,
of course, and many are settled by the parties with limited
judicial involvement.246 Still, the workload per judge is
massive. Any substantial increase in the volume of federal
litigation forces lower courts to spread their limited resources
even thinner.
If mandatory jurisdiction denies lower court judges the
option of simply ignoring the new cases, the hierarchical
system of stare decisis limits their flexibility to recalibrate
substantive law.247 The lower courts are bound by Supreme
Court decisions determining the generosity of constitutional
protections and the level of deference to other institutional
actors, the principal determinants of the expected benefits of
bringing a federal lawsuit.248 They are also bound by Supreme
Court decisions casting constitutional doctrine in the form of
vague standards, which reduces the likelihood of settlement
and thus increases the workload of federal judges.249 Supreme
Court precedent is not a steel vise. Lower court judges do have
some room to maneuver, which the evidence suggests they
sometimes employ to manage their workloads.250 But their
ability to do so is far more constrained than that of the
Supreme Court.

245. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 843–63 (describing judicial
resources and caseloads for courts of appeal and district courts); Marin K.
Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management
in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 325–65 (2011) [hereinafter Levy, The
Mechanics of Federal Appeals] (same for courts of appeal); REYNOLDS &
RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 8 tbl.1 (same).
246. See Guthrie & George, supra note 244, at 363 (“Most cases will settle
(even on appeal) because litigants can generally save money by doing so.”)
247. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey
Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994)
(“[L]ongstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow a
precedent established by a court ‘superior’ to it.”); Sanford Levinson, On
Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 845 (1993) (describing
the Supreme Court’s perception of lower federal courts as “the
simple . . . enforcer[s] of the Supreme Court’s dictates, however wise or
unwise they may appear to the hapless judge[s] below.”).
248. See supra note 247.
249. See Coan, supra note 17, at 433 (describing different approaches the
Supreme Court uses to budget judicial capacity).
250. See infra Part III.B.
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This leaves the lower courts with two unattractive
options—queuing and rationing. If federal judges continue to
allocate the same amount of time to each case in the face of an
increased volume of litigation, new cases will spend more time
languishing on federal dockets.251 This, in turn, may reduce the
attractiveness of filing suit in the first place. Such backlogs are
not unheard of, and there is substantial variation in the speed
with which judges, districts, and circuits clear cases.252 But
queuing is not the main method by which the lower courts
have allocated their limited capacity, probably because
clearance rates are published and monitored, and most judges
do not wish to be shamed before their colleagues.253
Instead, lower courts have mostly managed their greatly
increased workload by parceling out judicial attention and
resources ever more sparingly.254 Just how—and how
self-consciously—they do this remains somewhat opaque. The
courts of appeal have been better studied in this regard than
federal district courts.255 But this much is clear: at present
workloads, the lower courts have little choice but to ration

251. See Coan, supra note 17, at 429 (“As the volume of litigation
increases, the ability of the lower courts to process cases in a timely and
efficient fashion, while maintaining a commitment to minimum professional
standards, diminishes.”).
252. See Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal
District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1202 (2015) (noting that “there are
numerous district courts laboring under a higher disposition time” and
“numerous courts with a shorter disposition time” than the national median).
253. See POSNER, supra note 140, at 222 (“Although financial incentives
to working hard [on disposing of cases] are not a factor in the federal
judiciary, the normally weaker incentive (in modern Western culture) of
avoiding being shamed operates on most judges.”); see also Hatamyar Moore,
supra note 252, at 1235 (“[T]he median disposition time for civil cases has
not dramatically spiked since 1986: it has hovered right around eight months
for the past twenty-seven years.”); REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at
5 (noting that median time between submission and disposition remains
under a year and has grown only modestly since 1980).
254. See Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note 153, at
403–04 (“Although specific practices vary considerably from circuit to circuit,
their animating rationale is the same: to keep the courts running, some sets
of cases must receive considerably less judicial attention than others.”).
255. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155 (focusing on federal
courts of appeal); Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note
153 (same). But see Hatamyar Moore, supra note 252, at 1205–07 (focusing
on federal district courts).
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their attention. When they do so, they do not treat all cases or
litigants equally. Rather, they employ a system of judicial
triage, devoting more time and resources to those cases they
perceive to be worthiest of their time.256 The greater the
volume of litigation, the thinner judicial resources must be
stretched.
B.

Rationing Justice

This is perfectly reasonable, even inevitable, in the
abstract. Judicial time and resources are genuinely scarce, and
it is generally not in the power of judges to expand them.
Further, not all cases are equally difficult to resolve. It would
make little sense to allocate precisely equal resources to every
case. Uncomfortable as it makes most judges, rationing should
not be a dirty word. Nor should triage. But judgments about
the importance of cases and their worthiness of judicial
attention do not merely turn on neutrally defined questions of
legal difficulty, complexity, or novelty. They also reflect the
values, sympathies, and background of those making the
decisions. As William Reynolds and William Richman have
exhaustively documented, the result is a two-track system in
which the cases judges deem most significant—those involving
high-powered lawyers, complex commercial transactions, and
the interests of government agencies or officials—receive far
fuller appellate consideration than cases that do not meet
these criteria.257 Similar differences seem likely to exist at the
district court level, though the literature on this is
considerably less developed.258
In the remainder of this sub-Part, we describe the
two-track system of judicial triage adopted by the courts of
appeal for managing a caseload that would otherwise be
overwhelming. We then canvass a variety of other tools
available to the courts of appeal and federal district courts for
256. See infra Part III.B.1.
257. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 116 (“Track Two cases
disproportionately involve the claims of the disfavored in our
country—prisoners, the poor, immigrants. Circuit judges apparently prefer to
deal with other, more ‘important’ matters.”).
258. But see generally Paulluvi Bahl, Case-Management Practices in the
District of Arizona (2019) (unpublished student note), https://perma.cc/E994Y7Y4 (PDF).
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managing their overcrowded dockets. If the abolition or
limitation of qualified immunity triggers a substantial increase
in the volume of constitutional litigation, there is a significant
risk that the lower courts will deploy some combination of
these tools to manage the new strain on judicial resources.
Indeed, it is highly possible that lower courts will act
preemptively to ward off the threat of such an increase before
it actually materializes. The result would be the recreation of
something very like qualified immunity by another name.
1.

Judicial Triage

Between 1945 and 1990, the caseloads of the courts of
appeal grew by fifteen-fold, far faster than the number of
judges serving on these courts.259 Raw case numbers are a
crude measure for many reasons, but more sophisticated
measures confirm the startling trend and its continuation up
to the present day, though the rate of growth has slowed in
recent years.260 The causes of this caseload crisis are complex
and multifold, but most accounts agree that the expansion of
constitutional rights and habeas corpus relief by the Warren
Court, as well as that Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape, were
major factors.261 The dramatic growth of the federal
administrative state also played a role.262

259. McAlister, supra note 142, at 543.
260. See, e.g., Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 794 (“The data on
caseloads and capacity constraints suggest . . . [that] district and appellate
court caseloads per judge have continued to mount and the number of
certiorari petitions has more than doubled.”).
261. See McAlister, supra note 142, at 543–44
Since the 1960s, Congress has continuously expanded federal
criminal and civil jurisdiction. Increased litigiousness, coupled
with Warren Court decisions that expanded criminal and civil
rights, also affected federal dockets. Especially important was
Monroe v. Pape, which opened the door to civil liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations by state actors who
abuse their office. Since that 1961 decision, federal civil rights
actions under § 1983 “bec[a]me a major part of the work of the
federal courts.”
REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 4 (“The Warren Court’s revolutions
in constitutional law in the 1950s and 1960s play a large role [in the increase
in federal court filings].”); POSNER, supra note 140, at 327–28 (“[T]he activist
edifice erected by Chief Justice Warren and his colleagues . . . remains
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To cope with the vastly increased workload, federal judges
gradually evolved a system of judicial triage that consigned an
ever-growing number of cases to a second-tier system of review
bearing little resemblance to the model taught in most law
schools.263 The contrast to what Reynolds and Richman have
dubbed the “Learned Hand model”264 is stark. Under that
traditional approach, every appellate litigant was entitled to
have her case decided by lengthy published opinion after oral
argument and extensive deliberation by a panel of
well-prepared Article III judges.265 Cases relegated to “Track
Two,” on the other hand, are accorded none of these
perquisites.266 They are decided without oral argument
through unpublished opinions, which are often short, opaque,
and generally of startlingly low quality.267 Former Judge Alex
Kozinski, a strong supporter of such opinions, famously
described them as “not safe for human consumption.”268
Perhaps most important, Track Two cases are, for all
intents and purposes, decided by anonymous staff law clerks,
with little meaningful supervision by Article III judges, under
circumstances strongly encouraging uncritical affirmance of
largely intact . . . . The edifice is responsible in part for the heavy caseload of
the federal courts today.”).
262. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 809–10 (detailing the “new
challenges for the federal judiciary” resulting from the rise of the
administrative state during the first half of the twentieth century).
263. See McAlister, supra note 142, at 544 (describing the development of
“an ‘Appellate Triage model,’ by which the federal courts embraced
procedural and administrative reforms to institute a two-track or two-tier
system of appellate justice”).
264. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 116.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., id. at 121 (“[T]he poor quality of so many unpublished
opinions provides stark evidence that there has been a systemic breakdown
in the work product of the circuit courts.”); McAlister, supra note 142, at 535
(“These [unpublished] decisions are not precedential and make no law; they
are often short, perfunctory, unsigned opinions drafted for the benefit of the
parties, not the public.”). But see Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce
Resource, supra note 153, at 446 (defending this approach as a reasonable
response to severe resource constraints).
268. Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion: To Publish or Not, LEGALTIMES
(Apr. 12, 2004), https://perma.cc/66K6-P89E (PDF) (quoting Letter from Alex
Kozinski, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules).
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district court decisions.269 Over the past sixty years, Track Two
has gone from the exception to the rule. Marin Levy describes
it as the “backbone of federal appellate docket management.”270
Today, barely twenty percent of cases terminated on the merits
received oral argument.271 Less than ten percent of cases are
decided through published and signed opinions.272
The screening process employed to select cases for oral
argument and opinions for publication is opaque and varies
from circuit to circuit.273 But it is principally conducted by
administrative staff, and the small fraction of cases chosen for
Learned Hand treatment generally involve sophisticated
counsel, large organizations, or government interests.274 Social
security, immigration, veterans’ benefits appeals, prisoner
civil-rights claims, pro se actions, and suits brought by poor
and middle-class litigants with less sophisticated counsel are
much more likely to be relegated to Track Two.275 As Merritt
McAlister pithily sums it up, “Traditional appellate
process—including
oral
argument
and
judicial
scrutiny—continues for the system’s haves. But for its
have-nots, the promise of an appeal as of right has become
little more than a rubber stamp: ‘You lose.’”276

269. See McAlister, supra note 142, at 567 (“Second-tier
process . . . involves no oral argument and little judicial oversight, as staff
attorneys do the heavy lifting.”); Guthrie & George, supra note 244, at
363–85 (detailing possible reasons for the high affirmance rate among the
courts of appeal).
270. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note 153, at
415.
271. Judicial Business 2019 Tables, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
tbl.B-10, https://perma.cc/UK9Z-2EZH (PDF).
272. Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 858.
273. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 107 (detailing the
differing criteria the circuits use in screening cases for oral argument).
274. See id. at 192 (“Wealthy, powerful, institutional, and government
litigants get far more of the judges’ time and attention than do other
litigants.”).
275. See id. at 119 (“[C]ases involving prisoner rights, social security,
criminal convictions, and the like were disproportionately subject to
second-class treatment.”).
276. McAlister, supra note 142, at 536; see also Guthrie & George, supra
note 244, at 362 (noting that the affirmance rate in unpublished opinions is
“much higher” than in published opinions).
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The reported data is insufficiently granular to determine
how often constitutional tort appeals receive this treatment.277
But the typical lawyers and litigants in such cases have more
in common with those commonly relegated to Track Two than
with those who consistently receive the full Learned Hand
treatment.278 It also seems likely that government appeals of
adverse district court decisions have a better chance of
avoiding Track Two than those brought by constitutional tort
plaintiffs.279
Whether or not this is true, an actual or feared avalanche
of such cases following the demise of qualified immunity would
create a serious problem for courts of appeal already working
beyond capacity. Relegating such appeals to Track Two, where
staff law clerks have strong incentives to recommend
affirmance rather than reversal, will be a tempting solution.
This result would not only deny constitutional tort plaintiffs
the material benefits of a meaningful appeal; it would also
erode the legitimacy of the judicial system in much the same
way that qualified immunity does, by sending a signal that
constitutional tort suits are not worth judges’ time—or, worse,
that judges actively support impunity for government officials
who violate the Constitution.280
2.

Lightened Scrutiny

In addition to dramatically expanding summary
disposition, the courts of appeal have managed their exploding
caseload by relaxing their scrutiny of district court decisions.
The explanation is straightforward. Identifying and explaining
errors in the decision under review requires more time and
effort than affirming the correctness of their reasoning.281 It is
277. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 119120 (describing
the types of cases typically relegated to Track Two).
278. See id.; supra note 105 (collecting sources documenting racial
disparities in police misconduct).
279. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
280. McAlister, supra note 142, at 562 (“Decisions devoid of any positive
procedural justice experiences carry the potential to inflict harm; they
marginalize vulnerable litigants seeking relief in a court that is, effectively,
their last resort.”).
281. See POSNER, supra note 140, at 345 (“If the courts of appeals become
more intrusive in their review, this will . . . increase their workload . . . .”).
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therefore unsurprising that the rate at which the courts of
appeal reverse district court decisions has dropped by more
than half since the 1960s.282 Of course, correlation is not
necessarily causation, no matter how intuitive the causal link
between the variables in question.283 But there is compelling
evidence that rising caseloads do, in fact, cause lower reversal
rates.
After the September 11 attacks of 2001, accelerated
streamlining of deportations flooded the Second and Ninth
Circuits with tens of thousands of appeals from decisions of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.284 This, as Bert Huang has
explained, created a natural experiment.285 None of the other
circuits experienced this sudden spike in immigration
appeals.286 Those circuits could therefore serve as a control
group to evaluate the causal impact of the surge in
immigration appeals on reversal rates in the Second and Ninth
Circuits. Huang found that, “when flooded by the agency cases,
the affected circuit courts began to reverse district court
rulings less often . . . . In these circuits, it seems, deference
increased, tilting the balance of authority toward the district
courts.”287 In other circuits, meanwhile, reversals remained
steady. On this basis, Huang concludes that the spike in
immigration appeals caused the Second and Ninth Circuits to
reverse in fewer civil cases.288
The precise causal mechanisms at work remain opaque,
but Huang’s study sheds significant light on the possible
effects of abolishing qualified immunity. First, it suggests that
the courts of appeal are likely to respond to a substantial
increase in the volume of constitutional tort litigation by
increasing their deference to district court decisions.289
282. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 122.
283. See Guthrie & George, supra note 244, at 361 (making this
observation about caseloads and reversal rates).
284. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1123–24
(2011).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1115.
288. Id. at 1123–27.
289. See id. at 1130–33 (demonstrating that courts of appeal had lower
reversal rates in periods when case numbers surged).
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Whether this hurts or helps constitutional tort plaintiffs
largely depends on the distribution of district court errors in
such cases. If the district courts err more frequently in favor of
government defendants (as the courts of appeal define error),
then a relaxation of appellate scrutiny will hurt constitutional
tort plaintiffs. If the district courts err more frequently in favor
of plaintiffs, then relaxation of appellate scrutiny will hurt
defendants.
This, however, assumes that appellate scrutiny is relaxed
equally across the board. There is good reason to doubt that
will be the case. As Reynolds and Richman have shown, the
courts of appeal already accord higher priority to the interests
of government litigants in managing their oral argument
calendar and determining which decisions to publish.290 If an
increasing caseload requires appellate judges to relax their
scrutiny of district court decisions, it seems likely that they
will continue to show relatively greater solicitude for appeals
brought by government defendants than those brought by
constitutional tort plaintiffs. This would tip the scales in favor
of the former, regardless of the distribution of district court
errors. It might also skew the development of the law in a
pro-government direction, with binding circuit precedent
frequently highlighting errors against the government, while
errors in the government’s favor languish in the obscurity of
unpublished or otherwise cursory affirmances.291 As Margaret
Lemos has pithily observed, “[T]he law is shaped by the cases
judges are asked to decide.”292 She might have added “the cases
that judges choose to prioritize.”
There is some good news in Huang’s study for
constitutional tort plaintiffs. Recall that the spike in
immigration cases in the Second and Ninth Circuits reduced

290. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 116, 119–21 (showing
that claims by prisoners or the poor are deemed less important and
disproportionately subject to “track-two” unpublished decisions over more
important litigants such as the government or large corporations, which are
likely to receive the full Learned Hand Treatment).
291. See McAlister, supra note 142, at 538 (“Decisional atrophy
disproportionately affects pro se litigants because their cases are more likely
to receive the second-class treatment that produces the poorly or lightly
reasoned unpublished decisions. . . .”).
292. Lemos, supra note 152, at 78485.
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their reversal rates in civil cases.293 The spike may also have
reduced the reversal rate in immigration appeals, but Huang
does not say one way or the other.294 For present purposes, the
important point is that the Second and Ninth Circuits chose to
relieve at least some of the pressure created by the
immigration surge by changing their handling of a different
category of cases. Courts confronted with a flood of
constitutional tort litigation following the demise of qualified
immunity will have the same choice. As the proximate cause of
a new strain on judicial capacity, these cases will be a highly
salient target for reduced judicial attention. But that is not
inevitable. Compromise may be unavoidable, but constitutional
tort cases need not bear the full brunt of it.
3.

District Courts

Up to this point, our focus has been largely on the courts of
appeal. For a variety of reasons, the crisis of volume that has
prevailed since the 1960s has fallen more heavily on them than
on the federal district courts.295 But those courts, too, have
heavy caseloads and limited resources.296 Faced with the
sudden shock of a flood of new constitutional litigation, they,
too, will be forced to make the same judicial resources stretch
further. But owing to their different place in the judicial
hierarchy, district courts have different tools at their disposal.
Those tools are, in fact, considerably more numerous than
the tools available to the courts of appeal. This is because “a
district judge may rule in a single case on multiple occasions
and on different types of questions, only a few of which could
be dispositive but all of which affect the case’s progress and
ultimate outcome.”297 Most of these rulings are “less formal,
less visible, and more discretionary than the traditional
judicial activities of holding hearings, deciding motions, and

293. Huang, supra note 285, at 1137.
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., Menell & Vacca, supra note 26 (describing the unique and
longstanding crisis of volume in the courts of appeals); Levy, Judicial
Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note 153 (same).
296. Moore, supra note 252, at 1202.
297. Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge
Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 85 (2009).
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conducting trials.”298 They are even less visible than the
notoriously opaque docket management practices of the courts
of appeal. For this reason, the empirical literature on district
court responses to caseload pressures remains decidedly
sparse. They are simply much more difficult to study than the
courts of appeal.299
Nevertheless, there is ample theoretical reason to believe
that district judges “have a strong incentive to find ways to
take control of and manage the cases that appear on their
individual dockets,”300 especially in the face of increased
caseloads. They also have the tools to do so, many of which go
under the general heading of “case management.”301 As Steven
Gensler describes it, this process “typically begins with the
judge issuing a case-management order that sets a detailed
schedule based on the particular needs of the case. As the case
goes forward, the federal judge can continue to exercise control
by, among other things, closely managing the scope, timing,
and sequence of discovery and dispositive motions.”302
Restrictive discovery orders, explicitly encouraged by 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, play an
especially important role in modern case management.303 The
result is that plaintiffs are, with some indeterminate
frequency, denied the opportunity “to discover the facts needed
to prove their cases at trial, to defeat dispositive motions, or to
advocate for fair settlements.”304 This is an especially serious
problem in cases where defendants possesses most or all of the
information that plaintiffs need to substantiate their
claims—an information asymmetry that characterizes many
constitutional tort suits.305 At the same time, the available
298. Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the
Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 678 (2010).
299. Kim et al., supra note 297, at 84–86.
300. Gensler, supra note 298, at 676.
301. The classic academic study—and critique—of this approach to
judging is Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
302. Gensler, supra note 298, at 671.
303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), (g) (defining proportionality factors and
other limits to the scope of discovery).
304. Mark Spottswood, The Perils of Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV.
503, 528 (2014).
305. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 45
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empirical evidence suggests that “[i]ntensive and early case
management . . . may in fact increase overall litigation costs by
making more work for attorneys.”306 Both dynamics not only
tend to speed the resolution of cases, to the advantage of
defendants; they also reduce the expected benefit of bringing
suit and thus tend to reduce the volume of litigation going
forward. It is therefore little surprise that more aggressive
case
management
has
often
been
advocated—and
explained—as a response to rising caseloads.307
Beyond case management, district courts possess a
familiar array of procedural tools for quickly dispensing with
cases at the outset. In particular, modern justiciability doctrine
and the “plausibility pleading” regime established by Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly308 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal309 both
afford district judges ample discretion to restrict access to
court in the face of rising caseloads.310 Justiciability is likely to
play only a marginal role in constitutional tort suits that would
previously have been barred by qualified immunity. By
definition, these are suits for money damages, which seldom
pose serious justiciability questions.311 But raising the de facto
bar for surviving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under Twombly
and Iqbal is another matter.
Even before the Supreme Court increased the stringency
of pleading standards in those decisions, constitutional tort
suits were already substantially more likely than other civil
(2010) (arguing that information asymmetry harms plaintiffs in many
litigation contexts, especially in “actions challenging the conduct of large
institutions”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009) (“[I]n any case depending on subjective motivation
or concealed activities the plausibility pleading standard will . . . . [exclude]
claims whose merit depends on information the plaintiff may not yet have.”).
306. Spottswood, supra note 304, at 529.
307. Id.; Gensler, supra note 298, at 727–28.
308. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
309. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
310. See Miller, supra note 305, at 33 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal
introduce highly subjective factors into Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice that are
becoming a determinative factor of “whether a plaintiff will be allowed to
proceed to discovery”).
311. See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 178 (2012) (“[T]he
Court has said that ‘pocketbook’ or ‘wallet’ injury always qualifies [for Article
III standing].”).
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suits to be dismissed at the pleading stage.312 Under the new
plausibility regime, the Supreme Court invites district court
judges to “to draw on [their] judicial experience and common
sense” to determine whether a plaintiff’s complaint crosses the
threshold separating “mere possibility” from “plausibility.”313
One leading empirical analysis found that this change
negatively affected at least 18.1 percent of constitutional tort
suits that faced a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.314 It would not be
at all surprising if district courts faced with a sudden flood of
such litigation following the demise of qualified immunity
relied on the cloak of “judicial experience and common sense”
to dismiss even more of these suits. Doing so would not only
clear already filed cases from the docket; it would also reduce
the expected benefit of bringing more cases of this kind in the
future.
Of course, as with the courts of appeal, this outcome is not
inevitable. As Margaret Lemos puts it, “The risk of judicial
backlash is just that: a risk.”315 The district courts might
respond to an influx of new constitutional tort suits by raising
procedural hurdles to their success. But those courts might
also respond by changing their handling of a different category
of cases, just as the Second and Ninth Circuits did when faced
with a spike in immigration appeals. Lemos thinks this
unlikely: “[J]udges are prone to react with hostility to any
marked increases in the number of claims filed under a given
statute, especially if they were not favorably inclined toward
those claims in the first place.”316 But judges’ inclinations are
not static. They change with the composition of the judiciary,
and at least sometimes, with the social and cultural context in
which the judiciary operates.

312. Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the
Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270,
2332 (2012).
313. Id. at 2283 (quoting Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 679).
314. Id. at 2332.
315. Lemos, supra note 152, at 845.
316. Id. at 785.
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Substantive Rights

After all this discussion of procedure and case
management, it is necessary to say a few words about the
scope of substantive rights. In contrast to the Supreme Court,
lower courts have limited freedom to manage their dockets by
restricting the substantive scope of constitutional rights.317
Under principles of vertical stare decisis, the courts of appeal
are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent.318 District courts
are bound to follow both Supreme Court and circuit
precedent.319 And most empirical studies show that compliance
is fairly robust.320
By contrast, on almost all of the procedural questions
discussed above, lower courts enjoy wide, if not complete,
discretion. Courts of appeal and district courts exercise
essentially unfettered authority to decide which of their
opinions will be published, which cases and motions will
receive oral argument, and which questions to delegate to their
administrative staff.321 Both case management decisions and
the application of pleading standards are formally reviewable,
the former for abuse of discretion and the latter de novo.322 But
in both cases, the standards in question call for case-specific
judgments of degree that the Supreme Court generally has
almost zero interest in supervising.323 With respect to case

317. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 248, at 818 (“[L]ongstanding doctrine
dictates that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a
court ‘superior’ to it.”).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
383, 395 (2007) (“[M]ost systematic studies have found defiance to be rare
and compliance the norm.”).
321. See generally Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra
note 153 (cataloging the wide range of approaches the courts of appeals have
developed exercising this discretion).
322. See, e.g., Rosario-Diaz v. Gonzales, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1998)
(“[Courts] examine the trial judge’s case-management decisions under an
abuse of discretion rubric. . . .”); Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098
(10th Cir. 2009) (“The legal sufficiency of a complaint if a question of law,
and a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is reviewed de novo.”).
323. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 3, at 85 (noting the Supreme Court’s
general disinclination to review case-specific, fact-bound questions).
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management decisions, the harmless error rule gives district
court judges even wider latitude.324
For all of these reasons, the literature on lower-court
efforts to manage their limited capacity largely focuses on
these procedural tools. But it would be a mistake to overlook
the substantive levers at their disposal. The precedents that
bind lower-court judges limit their freedom to restrict
constitutional rights, but limit is not the same as eliminate.
Even the clearest Supreme Court decisions contain some gaps
and ambiguities, and many are shot through with them. This
is particularly true in areas like constitutional criminal
procedure where many of the Supreme Court’s decisions are
cast in the form of vague standards.325 In such areas, the lower
courts will often have sufficient freedom to reshape the
substantive contours of constitutional doctrine to consider this
as one viable tool among many for managing their limited
judicial capacity.
The logic is simple and largely tracks the way the
Supreme Court uses substantive doctrine to protect its limited
capacity.326 Making substantive law less generous to plaintiffs
reduces the expected benefits of filing suit and thus reduces
the volume of litigation. As with the procedural tools discussed
above, the perceived threat of a future surge in constitutional
tort litigation may be sufficient to trigger preemptive action
along these lines, even if the surge never materializes. But if
and when the lower courts take such action, they can allocate
their limited capacity in any number of ways. They might
reduce the volume of constitutional tort litigation by narrowing
the substantive constitutional rights asserted in such actions.
But they might instead narrow some other class of rights, in
effect diverting resources from that category of cases to
constitutional tort suits.

324. See Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal
Civil Litigation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 258–59 (1997) (describing how the
harmless error rule makes appellate review of case-management decisions
even more deferential).
325. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the
Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search
and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933 (2010).
326. See supra Part II.D.
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Feedback Effects

A final, crucially important wrinkle requires attention. As
Joanna Schwartz has emphasized, all of the capacity
management tools discussed above are merely individual
components “in an expansive collection of people, rules, and
practices that interact.”327 To understand how changes to one
aspect of this legal “ecosystem” will play out, it is necessary to
consider how they will interact with other aspects of the
system, which may counterbalance those changes or amplify
them, “dramatically shifting [the ecosystem’s] friendliness or
hostility to civil rights litigation over time.”328
This Article is an exploration of one possible and
extremely important counter-balancing effect. If the demise of
qualified immunity triggers—or is perceived to trigger—a flood
of new constitutional litigation, the limited capacity of the
lower courts may well trigger offsetting procedural or
substantive reactions that leave constitutional tort plaintiffs
little better off than they were under the current qualified
immunity regime. But Schwartz’s ecosystem analogy suggests
that the story may not end there. If the lower courts’ reaction
is disproportionate to the surge of cases unleashed by the
abolition of qualified immunity, or if the lower courts react
preemptively to a surge of cases that would never have
materialized, they may trigger feedback effects that leave
constitutional tort plaintiffs even worse off than they were
under qualified immunity.
There are too many possible scenarios to sketch even a
fraction of them here, but one of the simplest and worst cases
hinges on the role of a flourishing and sophisticated civil rights
bar. Good plaintiffs’ lawyers are a crucial part of any civil
rights ecosystem.329 Without them, little else matters.
Sympathetic judges, favorable doctrine, and compelling facts
will do plaintiffs no good without effective representation.330
327. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, supra note 148, at 1593.
328. Id. at 1545.
329. See id. at 1563.
330. See, e.g., id. at 1559 (“[T]he number of plaintiffs’ lawyers willing to
take civil rights cases—and the expertise of those lawyers—likely play a
significant role in the number of suits filed and the ultimate success of those
claims.”).
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But even a flourishing civil rights bar in a hospitable
jurisdiction is a fragile thing. Civil rights cases are risky and
only a small subset are seriously lucrative.331
Now, imagine that Congress or the Supreme Court
abolishes qualified immunity. Fearing a flood of litigation, the
lower courts begin employing a combination of procedural and
substantive tools to protect their limited capacity.
Miraculously, they get the calibration just right, making it no
more or less difficult to bring a constitutional tort suit on
average. But there is one small hitch. The average effects of
the docket-protective changes mask an important differential
effect. It is now slightly easier to bring low-value claims but
slightly harder to bring the high-value claims that are
essential to the financial viability of a sophisticated civil rights
bar. Given the small margins on which these firms operate,
this small change is enough to put several of them out of
business, making it dramatically more difficult for
constitutional tort plaintiffs to successfully pursue their
claims. Thus can a small change in one element of a civil rights
ecosystem lead to a large change in outcomes.
C.

Summing Up

There is a great deal we do not—and cannot—know for
certain about qualified immunity and the capacity of the lower
federal courts. We do not know whether qualified immunity
will be abolished or limited or maintained in its present form.
If the doctrine is merely limited, we do not know what the new
limits will be or how those limits will be applied by the judges
and juries charged with applying them. We do not know how
many new constitutional tort filings the limitation or abolition
of qualified immunity will trigger. We do not know how
lower-court judges will perceive this risk. We do not know
whether they will act preemptively to stave it off. If a flood of
constitutional tort litigation materializes, we do not know how
courts will manage this new demand on their limited capacity.
Despite this uncertainty, there is strong reason to suspect
that the judicial capacity constraints of lower federal courts
331. See Schwartz, Selection Effects, supra note 138, at 1143 (“Indeed,
many attorneys described civil rights litigation as a very financially risky
line of work. . . .”).
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will play a decisive role in shaping the future of constitutional
tort litigation if and when qualified immunity is significantly
curtailed. We know that lower federal courts are obligated to
decide every case presented to them. We know that those
courts are already under tremendous strain. We know that
judicial decisions increasing the expected benefit of filing
constitutional tort suits have substantially increased the
volume of litigation in the past. We know that past demands
on scarce judicial resources have led the lower courts to
develop an array of tools, procedural and substantive, for
allocating those resources. We know that substantial new
demands on the lower courts will force them to stretch those
scarce resources even farther. We know that the available tools
for doing so have the potential to replicate many of the effects
of qualified immunity and to do so all but invisibly. They may
even make constitutional tort plaintiffs worse off than they
were under qualified immunity. Finally, we know that federal
courts have a wide range of choice in deploying these tools and
that this outcome is not inevitable.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In the face of such knowledge, it would be a serious
mistake for advocates of governmental accountability to limit
their vision to the dismantling of qualified immunity. That is a
tall enough order, to be sure. But if and when qualified
immunity is dismantled, that is very likely to be merely Round
One in the battle for constitutional accountability. Round Two
will involve persuading the lower courts and perhaps also the
Supreme Court not to claw back the gains of abolishing or
limiting qualified immunity in the service of judicial capacity.
If anything, this will be an even taller order. Imagine knocking
out a champion prizefighter only to be confronted with her
ghost—elusive, spectral, omnipresent, and unrelenting. Such is
the nature of the challenge that will follow in the wake of
qualified immunity reform.
Meeting that challenge will require sustained thinking
and action of a different character than most critics of qualified
immunity have yet contemplated. As a first step in that
direction, this Part surveys several possible paths forward. We
begin with legal challenges to capacity-management tools and
expanding the judiciary, which we regard as decidedly
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unpromising. We then turn to case management reform and
popular mobilization. Neither will be easy or problem-free. Nor
is either likely to be sufficient on its own. But in combination,
we believe they hold significant promise.
A.

Equilibration Redux

Before beginning our survey, it will be helpful to revisit
“the equilibration thesis”332 that has informed much of the best
and most familiar scholarship on qualified immunity in recent
years. As Richard Fallon explains it, this thesis “holds that
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by
seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall alignment of
doctrines involving justiciability, substantive rights, and
available remedies.”333 As to qualified immunity specifically,
Fallon suggests that “system designers should view official
immunity, including qualified immunity, not as a regrettable
necessity, but as a valuable, adaptable device for achieving the
best overall regime of substantive rights, rights to sue for tort
remedies, and immunity defenses.”334 This observation is
normative, but Fallon strongly implies that courts in fact view
qualified immunity in these terms.335
The upshot is that critics of qualified immunity should be
careful what they wish for: “[I]f the costs of the Supreme Court
rulings in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education336 and
Miranda v. Arizona337 had included damages remedies . . . the
Court might have felt unable to decide Brown and Miranda as
it did.”338 Put more generally, the abolition of qualified
immunity might leave constitutional tort plaintiffs with fewer
and less robust rights to enforce. This useful cautionary note
has been sounded by numerous other scholars, and it bears a

332. Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies, supra note
237, at 637.
333. Id.; see also Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, supra note 235, at 873 (“[C]onstitutional rights are inevitably
shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns.”).
334. Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 62, at 965.
335. Id.
336. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
337. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
338. Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 62, at 968.
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passing resemblance to the central thesis of this Article.339 The
prospect that judges will take countermeasures to stem the
flood of litigation triggered by qualified immunity’s demise is
indeed a form of equilibration. But our argument departs from
the work of the equilibration theorists in two crucial respects.
First, those theorists are principally concerned with the
substantive equilibrium produced by the interaction of
justiciability doctrine, rights, immunities, and remedies. If
courts limit immunities or relax justiciability requirements,
the equilibration theorists worry that judges will feel
compelled to constrict either rights or remedies to maintain the
same rough balance between the substantive jurisprudential
goods of deterrence, compensation, and zealous conduct of
government business.340 Our focus, by contrast, is on the
workload equilibrium produced by the interaction of pleading
standards, district and appellate court case management and
publication practices, rights, and qualified immunity. If
Congress or courts abolish or curtail qualified immunity, we
worry that judges will feel compelled to adopt offsetting
measures—procedural, substantive, or both—to safeguard
their limited capacity.
Second, equilibration theorists largely treat the status quo
equilibrium as fixed and assume that the options for
maintaining that equilibrium are domain-specific. If damages
remedies were available in Brown or Miranda, the rights
established in those cases would have to be narrowed or
abandoned, almost mechanically, as necessary to maintain the
status quo equilibrium. As a descriptive matter, this may or
may not be plausible, but it tends to induce an attitude of
fatalistic resignation.
Our argument, by contrast, emphasizes the wide degree of
choice judges possess in maintaining their workload
equilibrium, both as to the importance they assign particular
categories of cases and the tools they employ to manage any
new surge in the volume of litigation. If the abolition of
qualified immunity triggers a flood of constitutional tort suits,
one possible outcome is that the lower courts will relegate

339. E.g., Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
supra note 235.
340. See Fallon, Bidding Farewell, supra note 62.
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those cases to Track Two, effectively recreating qualified
immunity by another name. But another possibility is that
courts might relegate a different category of cases to Track
Two—or otherwise divert resources from other areas—to make
room for the influx of new cases. Recognizing this range of
judicial choices is what makes it possible to discuss potential
paths forward, as we do in the remainder of this Part.
B.

Dead Ends

We begin our discussion with two apparently attractive
approaches that strive to confront the judicial capacity problem
directly. If judges respond to the abolition of qualified
immunity by relegating constitutional tort suits to Track Two
or otherwise recreating qualified immunity by another name,
that response might itself be challenged as unconstitutional or
otherwise unlawful.341 Alternatively, and even better, the lower
courts could be substantially expanded to eliminate the crisis
of volume that presently requires them to carefully husband
their limited capacity.342 Unfortunately, both of these
approaches turn out to be dead ends.
1.

Legal Challenges

To most people without legal training, it must surely seem
deeply wrong for federal judges to avoid their duty to decide
cases and “administer justice without respect to persons”343
through procedural legerdemain. It must seem doubly wrong
for judges to do this for the apparently self-interested purpose
of easing their own workloads at the expense of litigants’
constitutional rights. One is reminded of the reaction of Mr.
Bumble from Oliver Twist: “If the law supposes that, the law is
a ass—a idiot.”344
Many legal commentators have shared this reaction, and
several have advanced creative legal arguments against the

341. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 72–82 (summarizing
the constitutional challenges to the two-track system and concluding that
those challenges have failed and similar arguments will likely fail too).
342. See Menell & Vacca, supra note 26 (advocating this approach).
343. 28 U.S.C. § 453.
344. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 425 (Random House 2015) (1838).
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system of judicial triage discussed in Part II.345 Most of these
have sounded in equal protection and due process.346 Some
have emphasized the disparity in treatment between Track
Two cases and those receiving the Learned Hand treatment.347
Others have emphasized the due process right to a reasoned
explanation, ostensibly denied by cursory unpublished opinions
and orders.348 Still others have emphasized the inconsistency
between the very idea of non-precedential decisions and
rule-of-law values, including the basic obligation to treat like
cases alike.349
These arguments suffer from three key flaws as a response
to the risk that judges will recreate qualified immunity by
another name. First, they have almost no chance of success
under presently prevailing doctrine.350 When such arguments
have been raised in the past, courts have greeted them with
uniform disfavor.351 Second, even if successful, these
arguments would likely benefit only a smattering of individual
plaintiffs when the real problem is a systemic one. Third, none
of these arguments grapples with the basic reality that the
lower federal courts are burdened by far more cases than they
could possibly resolve through the Learned Hand model or its
district-court equivalent. Even an authoritative Supreme
Court decision declaring judicial triage unconstitutional would
not change this, and the lower courts would very likely find
other coping mechanisms.
There is yet another problem. The constitutional
arguments in question are, at best, applicable to a subset of the
capacity-management tools canvassed in Part II. They have no
purchase at all against aggressive case management practices,
subtle tightening of pleading standards, de facto—and likely
345. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 72–80 (canvassing
these arguments).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See id. at 73 (noting that this argument similarly failed because the
Constitution only requires a fair decision, not an explanation).
349. See id. at 75–80 (examining the argument that “Article III required
every decision to have precedential status,” including unpublished decisions,
and the argument’s ultimate demise).
350. See supra note 341.
351. Id.
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disparate—lightened scrutiny, or changes in the scope of
substantive rights motivated by judicial capacity concerns. For
all of these reasons, we do not think that legal challenges hold
much promise as strategy for Round Two of the battle over
qualified immunity.
2.

More Judges

Another, even more straightforward, response to the
problem would be for Congress to expand the number of lower
court judges, perhaps including magistrate judges.352 Many
commentators have advocated for this over the years,353 and
Congress has several times expanded the number of judges
during the crisis of volume, but it has not done so in many
years, and the judges it added in the past have not kept pace
with exploding federal dockets.354 If the problem for
constitutional tort litigation and other disfavored classes of
cases is that there are too many cases per lower-court judge,
why not hire more judges? In their landmark study of the crisis
of volume, Reynolds and Richman describe this as “the single
most obvious solution to the caseload glut.”355 They were
writing about the courts of appeal,356 but the same argument
would seem to hold for the district courts.
There are serious questions about the desirability and
implementation of this proposal. As Reynolds and Richman
freely concede, only a “radical” increase in the number of
judges would eliminate the enormous strain on judicial
capacity that the federal courts are currently laboring under.357
352. See, e.g., Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note
153, at 404 (“[S]cholars, along with other academics and judges, have called
for changes to the courts’ constraints—an increase in the number of judges or
a decrease in the number of cases.”).
353. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism,
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand
Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 278 (1996) (“[R]adical increase in the size
of the federal appellate judiciary [is] the only way to maintain, or more
accurately, regain the traditional appellate process in the circuit courts.”).
354. See Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource, supra note 153, at
412 (“Congress has not created new judgeships sufficient to keep pace with
growing dockets . . . .”).
355. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 167.
356. See supra note 245.
357. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 6.
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But as Marin Levy notes, “[M]ore than two-thirds of [federal
appellate judges] reported that they believed the maximum
number of judges for a court to ‘function[] as a single decisional
unit,’ creating a cohesive body of law, is between eleven and
seventeen.”358 As Levy also notes, the implementation of
judicial expansion raises a number of tricky questions.359 The
most notable is how quickly the new judgeships should be
filled—all at once by the currently sitting President or
gradually over time.360 In today’s polarized political climate,
the former would immediately be tarred as court-packing,
eliciting howls of protest from the opposing party.361 The latter
would do far less to address the judicial capacity problem.
The most serious difficulty is simply that significant
judicial expansion seems unlikely to pass Congress anytime
soon. Sitting federal judges have lobbied strenuously against it
for decades, apparently fearing a loss of the prestige that
comes with exclusivity.362 And Congress has displayed little
interest in the matter.363 Certainly, no divided or
out-party-controlled Congress would pass such legislation,
gifting an opposing President with a raft—or even a
handful—of new judicial appointments. Even a unified
Congress would have trouble passing it unless and until the

358. Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386,
2405–06 (2014) [hereinafter Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal] (second
alteration in original); see Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating
Judicial Attention, 73 VAND. L. REV. 605, 609 (2020) (“Judging is a social,
collective enterprise. In order to apply and develop a coherent system of law,
judges need attend to not only their own cases, but also to one another.”).
359. See Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, supra note 358, at 2403.
360. See id.
361. Cf. Jeannie Suk Gerson, What Democrats Achieve by Threatening to
Pack the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Oct. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/FY6FTP4T (noting that if the number of Justices were increased at this “politically
polarized moment,” it would “constitute such a frank acknowledgment of
partisanship”).
362. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 143 (“[S]ubstantial
increases on the number of circuit judgeships will reduce the prestige of the
position and thus diminish the pool of distinguished attorneys willing to
serve on the bench.”).
363. See Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, supra note 358, at 2406
(explaining that Congress “appears to have little interest in expanding the
bench”).
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Senate abolishes the filibuster. And that puts to one side the
firestorm that charges of court-packing would be likely to raise.
Perhaps the best hope for serious reform lies in Peter
Menell and Ryan Vacca’s proposal “for Congress to establish a
judiciary reform commission tasked with developing a judiciary
reform act that would not go into effect until 2030.”364 By
delaying the effective date of reform, Menell and Vacca hope to
place the commissioners “behind a veil of ignorance that would
enable them to focus on the best interests of future generations
of citizens (including judges and practitioners), while at the
same time drawing upon their own experiences.”365 This logic
has real force, but the proposal still strikes us as a serious long
shot, given the intensity of partisan feeling surrounding
judicial appointments.366 A delay of ten years also significantly
reduces its appeal as a strategy for Round Two, especially since
the final result could well be a phased expansion that would
spread new judicial appointments over several presidential
administrations. To paraphrase John Lennon, the recreation of
qualified immunity by another name is what happens when
you are busy making other plans.367
C.

Paths Worth Exploring

We now turn to two approaches that strike us as more
promising. Rather than sacrificing decisional quality or
procedural rigor to cope with a flood of new constitutional
litigation, judges might be persuaded to respond to the
abolition of qualified immunity by increasing the efficiency of
their case-management practices. Alternatively, or in addition,
critics of qualified immunity might continue working with
social movements to highlight the importance of constitutional
tort suits not only to the traditional objectives of corrective
justice and deterrence of law-breaking but also to the

364. Menell & Vacca, supra note 26, at 879.
365. Id.
366. See Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms, and Federal
Judicial Appointments, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 521 (2018) (“The
politics of federal judicial appointments is as heated and as high-profile now
as it has ever been in American history.”).
367. See JOHN LENNON, BEAUTIFUL BOY (DARLING BOY) (Geffen Records
1981) (“Life is what happens to you while you’re busy making other plans.”).
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sociological legitimacy of the American constitutional project.
Neither of these approaches amounts to anything like a
panacea. But together, they offer the best hope of winning
Round Two and replacing qualified immunity with a
constitutional tort system consistent with equal justice under
law.
1.

Case Management Reform

As with any resource allocation problem, federal courts
faced with a flood of new qualified immunity suits will have
two essential choices. They can engage in yet more extensive
triage, further reducing the quality of judicial process afforded
to the average case.368 Or they can find creative ways to use
their resources more efficiently. Likely, they will need to do
both. But the more they do of the latter, the less they will need
to do of the former.369 Of course, it is easier to talk about
increasing efficiency than actually to do so. The lower federal
courts are an enormous and, in most respects, quite a
decentralized bureaucracy.370 To meaningfully increase the
efficiency of the system as a whole is no small task. But there
is some empirical evidence that it can be done.
In an intriguing extension and critique of Bert Huang’s
study of the Second and Ninth Circuits, Shay Lavie found that
the Second Circuit reduced its reversal rate in response to the
post-9/11 surge in immigration appeals, but the Ninth Circuit
did not.371 He persuasively attributes this discrepancy to the
Ninth Circuit being “a more innovative, flexible court of
appeals. It has leveraged its ongoing workload difficulties to
develop ‘organizational resiliency against changes’ in its

368. See Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, 27 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 57, 68 (2016) (stating that courts can use “milder weapons” to
fight caseload pressures, such as “working more efficiently and/or changing
their procedures”).
369. See id. (explaining that while “[w]orkload pressure should affect
courts . . . appellate courts and judges have a rich repertoire of mechanisms
to choose from, from working more efficiently, to changing their procedures
and reducing decision quality”).
370. See Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals, supra note 245, at 318
(“Judges themselves acknowledge that they are unacquainted with the
case-management practices of courts outside their own.”).
371. See Lavie, supra note 368, at 60.
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docket, ‘institut[ing] much cutting-edge experimentation,’
which has resulted in innovative time-management
practices.”372
Those practices include: “mini en bancs,” in which only a
fraction of active judges participate; sharing of bench
memoranda across chambers; and unusually heavy usage of
visiting judges.373 The Ninth Circuit also increased the number
of oral arguments heard by each panel of judges and developed
an innovative “priority algorithm” to determine the sequence
in which cases should be heard and to group similar cases
before a single panel.374 As a result of this flexible and
innovative culture, Lavie concludes, the Ninth Circuit was able
to withstand the surge in immigration appeals without
reducing its scrutiny of district court decisions.375 Lacking such
a culture, the Second Circuit was not able to do so.376
Lavie’s analysis suggests that reducing procedural and
decisional quality is not the only possible response to increased
judicial workloads. In at least some circumstances,
efficiency-enhancing innovation is a viable alternative. In even
more circumstances, it should represent a valuable
complement to other capacity-management tools. The Ninth
Circuit’s creative uses of technology are especially intriguing in
this regard because the power of potentially applicable
technologies continues to grow at a rapid pace.377 One
interesting illustration is Ryan Copus’s recent proposal to use
machine learning techniques that he calls “statistical
precedent” to identify those cases most in need of full-blown,
372. Id. at 61.
373. Id. at 61 n.13.
374. See id. at 85 n.145 (explaining the priority algorithm).
375. Id. at 82.
376. Id. at 88. Somewhat paradoxically, Lavie suggests that it was the
Ninth Circuit’s well-established willingness to cut procedural corners (e.g.,
the frequency of oral argument and the role of staff attorneys) that enabled it
to absorb the caseload surge without sacrificing the quality of its decisions.
Id. at 60–61. The Second Circuit, by contrast, had historically prided itself on
a refusal to cut such corners, in particular with respect to oral argument. Id.
at 60. Unable to bend in the face of an overwhelming caseload spike, it broke.
Id. at 61.
377. See AI and the Courts, AM. ASSOC. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI.,
https://perma.cc/R4BX-9ZMX
(describing
modern
advancements
of
technology pertaining to the U.S. court system).
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Learned-Hand-style appellate review.378 We have some
concerns about the tendency of such an approach to entrench
the failures of the existing system of judicial triage, a risk
Copus candidly acknowledges.379 But such approaches
certainly deserve further exploration.
The question of how to encourage courts to undertake
efficiency-enhancing case-management reform is more difficult.
Lavie attributes the Ninth Circuit’s relatively successful
management of its caseload spike to a distinctive circuit
culture, which grew out of a series of prior case-management
challenges and failures.380 The existence and resilience of
diverse cultures across the circuits has been noted by other
scholars of judicial administration, who attribute this
phenomenon to some combination of random variation,
functional differences, and path dependence.381 But if these
circuit-specific
norms
are
the
primary
driver
of
case-management innovation, it is not clear what might be
done to encourage more of it. The best, if imperfect, answer is
probably to encourage more extensive sharing of information
across circuits. Agencies like the Federal Judicial Center and
the Administrative Office of United States Courts also have a
role to play, as do the academics who work with them.
This will certainly not be a walk in the park. We are not
entirely confident its prospects for success exceed those of
expanding the judiciary. But it has three principal advantages
over that proposal. First, it has not been vigorously pressed for
decades without success. Second, it does not have to run the
gauntlet of congressional gridlock. And third, the potential for

378. See Copus, supra note 358, at 611 (“[A] system of statistical
precedent can help the courts more fairly and effectively allocate attention,
thereby promoting the courts’ error-correcting and law-developing
functions.”).
379. See id. at 660 (“More worrisome is the possibility that statistical
precedent helps to cement historical judicial failures to identify decisions
that both past and present judges would—if they paid more attention—agree
are in error.”).
380. Lavie, supra note 368, at 73.
381. See id. at 7172 (“[A]s courts of appeals enjoy relative freedom in
designing their internal procedures, the background differences had
translated into different rules and norms.”); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff,
On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 161 (1998) (discussing
the varying norms between circuits).
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harnessing the power of emerging technologies is already
impressive and growing by the year. For all of these reasons,
we believe this path forward deserves further exploration.
2.

Social and Popular Movements

We have saved the most promising, but also the most
difficult, approach for last. If qualified immunity is abolished
or curtailed, how judges respond to an actual or perceived flood
of constitutional tort litigation will be determined largely by
their collective views about the importance of these suits.382
There is significant reason to worry that many, if not most,
federal judges today view constitutional tort litigation as
relatively unimportant and more than usually likely to give
rise to frivolous claims.383 If this is and remains the case, it
seems more likely than not that the lower federal courts will
respond to the abolition or reform of qualified immunity by
recreating its practical equivalent by another name,
consciously or unconsciously motivated by judicial capacity
concerns.
There are two ways for advocates of governmental
accountability to flip this script: (1) advocate for the
appointment of judges who hold different views (and elect
officials who will appoint and confirm them); and (2) reshape
the cultural environment in which current judges live and from
which they derive their intuitions about what cases and issues
merit the attention of busy federal courts. Both efforts are
crucial and both are ongoing, to a greater extent than at any
time in recent memory.384 The political strategists, movement
382. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 155, at 119–20 (attributing
judicial triage decisions to judges’ sense of which cases are important and
which are not).
383. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 168 (recounting judicial
hostility to constitutional litigation across a broad range of doctrines and
domains).
384.
See, e.g., Jacqueline Thompson, Public Defender Experience and
Diversity Dominates at Biden’s Judicial Nominees’ First Hearing, LAW.COM
(Apr. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/FT3F-FNS2 (noting dramatic increase in
racial diversity and public-defender experience among President Biden’s
judicial nominees); Tierney Sneed, Inside Democrats’ Quest to Nominate
Judges Who Break the Ex-Prosecutor Mold, CNN (July 30, 2021),
https://perma.cc/5LUX-2PGN (explaining the political groundwork behind
this shift in judicial nominations).
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leaders, and grassroots activists on the front lines do not need
our advice about how to pursue this work most effectively.
Instead, we limit ourselves to two points.
First, it would be all too easy for the energy behind these
efforts to ebb or even collapse once qualified immunity is
formally abolished or curtailed. The doctrine of qualified
immunity has a name and a clear line of precedents behind it.
It also has clear-cut victims, with names, and faces, and
sympathetic—often tragic—stories to tell.385 These kinds of
simple, easily accessible symbols are the lifeblood of
widespread popular political mobilization.386 In contrast, the
ghost of qualified immunity that threatens to replace it, indeed
recreate it, will have no name or clear-cut victims. It will be
virtually invisible, except to the relatively few who know
enough to look. This will make it enormously challenging to
sustain the current momentum in Round Two of the battle over
qualified immunity. Those working in the trenches would do
well to begin planning for this challenge now.
Second, both appointment and cultural change are crucial
and proven avenues of influence. This is hardly a controversial
point with respect to appointment. But it bears emphasis that
not all appointments are created equal, even among nominees
with strong track records of ideological loyalty to their party’s
broad jurisprudential agenda. Had President Trump and his
advisors paid attention, it was easily foreseeable that Neil
Gorsuch would vote differently than other staunch judicial
conservatives in federal Indian law cases.387 It was also easily
foreseeable that Sonia Sotomayor would vote—and
write—differently than Stephen Breyer or Merrick Garland in

385. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Ernest, 933 F.3d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 2019)
(granting qualified immunity where an officer used a takedown maneuver
against a small woman, slamming her to the ground, and knocking her
unconscious).
386. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 190, at 63 (emphasizing the role of
“simple symbols” in driving mass political mobilization).
387. Compare McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459–82 (Justice
Gorsuch delivering the majority opinion, joined by liberal Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan), with id. at 2482–2502 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (conservative Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Thomas joining
Chief Justice John Robert’s dissent).
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qualified immunity cases.388 Even in this hyper-polarized era,
both major parties are bigger tents than is sometimes realized.
Going forward, any Democratic judicial nominee is likely to
favor the abolition or curtailment of qualified immunity.389 But
not all will feel strongly enough about the social importance of
constitutional tort litigation to resist the de facto recreation of
qualified immunity in the name of judicial capacity. Advocates
of government accountability should be aware of this rather
subtle distinction and would do well to monitor it closely. The
ethnic diversity and professional backgrounds of President
Biden’s early judicial nominees, which include far more public
defenders and civil-rights lawyers than the historical norm, are
a significant step in this direction.390
The influence of a shifting cultural environment on
judicial priorities may seem more dubious. Aren’t the vast
majority of federal judges mature adults of unusually
well-settled worldviews? Hasn’t the judicial nomination
process selected ever more carefully for exactly such persons
over the past several decades? Perhaps. But there is excellent
reason to believe that social movements influence federal
judges in much the same way they influence anyone else, by a
sort of cultural osmosis.391 This is a straightforward corollary
of the truism that judges tend to reflect the views, background
assumptions, and prejudices of their socioeconomic class.392
When the outlook of that class changes, as it sometimes does in

388. Compare Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 8–19 (2015) (per curiam)
(holding that a state trooper was shielded by qualified immunity when he
shot and killed a motorist fleeing from arrest), with id. at 26 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“By sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing,
the Court renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”).
389. Cf. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (severely criticizing qualified immunity).
390. See Mark Sherman & Darlene Superville, Biden’s Judges: More
Diverse and More of Them, AP (Aug. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/Q22K-TSYQ.
391. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change)
the Constitution: The Case of New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 29
(2005) (“[W]e know that social movements do influence constitutional
interpretation.”).
392. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 73 (2008) (“A
judge’s personal background characteristics, such as race and sex, and his
personal and professional experiences are among the nonpolitical, nonlegalist
factors that have been found to influence his decisions.”).
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response to social and popular movements, the outlook of
judges changes too.393
Historical examples abound. Reva Siegel and various
coauthors have written extensively about the influence of the
civil rights and women’s movements on the Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions.394 Lawrence Lessig has written about
the influence of social movements on judges’ sense of what is
contestable and uncontestable, with particular reference to
discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.395 As
he pithily sums up the point, “Judges can’t, as it were, spit in
the wind of what we all know is true.”396
Of course, the “we” in this sentence is crucial. Black
Americans and other marginalized groups have long known
the realities of police harassment, brutality, and legal
impunity.397 They have more than known these realities; they
have lived them. But thanks to the popular movement inspired
by George Floyd, the rest of the country has begun to wake up
to these deeply entrenched features of American life.398 The
shift in public polling within the first few weeks of the first
393. See BAUM & DEVINS, supra note 67, at 50 (explaining that “the
Court’s support for civil liberties in the face of public disapproval” during the
Warren Court was caused in part by the “education of socialization of elites”).
394. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Text
in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
395. See Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory:
What a Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1843 (1997)
(discussing the rise “in equality claims by gays and lesbians”).
396. Id.
397. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 98 (2010) (“In every state
across our nation, African Americans—particularly in the poorest
neighborhoods—are subjected to tactics and practices that would result in
public outrage and scandal if committed in middle-class white
neighborhoods.”).
398. Toluse Olorunnipa & Griff Witte, Born with Two Strikes: How
Systemic Racism Shaped Floyd’s Life and Hobbled his Ambition, WASH. POST
(Oct. 8, 2020, 7:47 AM), https://perma.cc/NK2E-KSQM (explaining that
Floyd’s death prompted many Americans to “probe the broader question” of
racist systems).

1516

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1433 (2021)

major protests was stunningly large.399 But there are
significant signs of regression and backlash, after those heady
early days.400 And rising crime rates have the potential to pull
public attitudes further back toward complacency and
uncritical support for law enforcement.401 But if the impact is
lasting, federal judges are unlikely to be immune.
The stakes for the future of constitutional tort litigation
are profound. Judges who view such cases as simply part of the
great mass of “boring, routine claims” that crowd their dockets
are likely to behave accordingly—even, and perhaps especially,
if qualified immunity is abolished or curtailed.402 At the
appellate level, such judges will relegate these cases to Track
Two or acquiesce in such relegation. They will also subject
appeals by individuals asserting their constitutional rights to
more relaxed scrutiny than appeals brought by government
officials. At the district-court level, such judges will subject
constitutional tort suits to aggressive case management,
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain the evidence
they need to pursue their claims and reducing the expected
benefit of filing suit in the first place. They may also raise the
de facto bar for pleading a plausible claim under Twombly and
Iqbal or employ their own versions of the appellate triage
system to limit the judicial attention accorded these cases.
By contrast, judges who have learned the lessons of the
George Floyd era will understand, intuitively, that
constitutional tort suits do not merely concern the
399. See, e.g., Nolan D. McCaskill, ‘A Seismic Quake’: Floyd Killing
Transforms Views on Race, POLITICO (June 10, 2020, 4:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/D3TZ-UQTH (“Six in 10 white Americans now say racism is
‘a big problem’ in society, an enormous increase from polls taken when
Barack Obama was president.”).
400. See, e.g., Audra D. S. Burch et al., The Death of George Floyd
Reignited a Movement. What Happens Now?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021),
https://perma.cc/7XAU-Q7H6 (last updated June 25, 2021) (describing signs
of backlash to the Black Lives Matter movement, including legislation that
would protect the police); Pauly, supra note 6 (same).
401. Domenico Montanaro, Rising Violent Crime is Likely to Present a
Political Challenge for Democrats in 2022, NPR (July 22, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://perma.cc/E7GD-46XP (discussing the “debate over [police] funding”
and the “the rise in crime”).
402. See Lemos, supra note 152, at 84445 (“A judge who believes that a
given type of claim is uninteresting or unimportant is unlikely to react
favorably to an increase in the number of those claims filed in his court.”).
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compensatory and dignitary interests of individual litigants,
important as those interests are. They also implicate the
interests of the entire community and the legitimacy of the
entire American constitutional project. At bottom, these cases
are about legal accountability and the rule of law. The way
they are handled by federal courts sends a powerful signal
about the scope and limits of the community to which these
principles apply. Federal judges who understand this will be
far more likely to make constitutional tort cases a priority,
even in the face of significant caseload pressures.403
Of course, we do not expect that the Black Lives Matter
movement will transform staid, life-tenured federal judges into
radical activists for racial justice. But that is not a prerequisite
for positive change. The women’s movement did not convert
staid, life-tenured federal judges into radical feminists. But it
did radically reshape the cultural environment in which those
judges lived and worked, making it impossible for them to
unsee many pernicious social realities that had previously
flown beneath their radar.404 The best and best-known example
is hostile work environment sexual harassment, considered a
radical notion when Catherine MacKinnon popularized the
term in 1978,405 but unanimously embraced by the Supreme
Court less than ten years later.406 While much work and

403. The coruscating opinion issued by U.S. District Judge Carlton
Reeves in a “driving while Black” case shortly after George Floyd’s death is
an example of how judges’ personal understanding of these issues can
powerfully shape their work. See Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d
386, 423 (D. Miss. 2020) (“Overturning qualified immunity will undoubtedly
impact our society. Yet, the status quo is extraordinary and unsustainable.
Just as the Supreme Court swept away the mistaken doctrine of ‘separate
but equal,’ so too should it eliminate the doctrine of qualified immunity.”).
404. See Reva Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 8, 8 (Catherine A. MacKinnon &
Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003) (“Responding on many fronts to the demands of the
second-wave feminist movement, the American legal system began slowly to
yield to this challenge, and for the first time recognized women’s right to
work free of unwanted sexual advances.”).
405. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 4 (1978) (“[S]exual harassment of
women at work is sex discrimination in employment.”).
406. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding
that a claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII). Remarkably, the majority opinion
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uncertainty remains, there is reason to hope that the present
mass movements for racial justice will produce a similar shift
in public and elite consciousness.
This prospect is complicated by the intense political
polarization that prevails across American society today. As
Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins explain in their excellent
recent book, judges have always been strongly influenced by
the social and cultural networks in which they are
enmeshed.407 But among political and professional elites these
networks have become far more polarized along ideological
lines.408 In the past, liberal and conservative judges were often
part of the same networks and, as a result, often subscribed to
an elite consensus, especially on social issues, that diverged,
sometimes sharply, from mainstream public opinion.409 Today,
liberal and conservative judges consume different news media;
belong to different, ideologically oriented professional
associations; and move in different, more ideologically
homogenous social networks.410
The upshot is that the ongoing mass movements for racial
justice are likely to influence the perceptions of liberal and
conservative judges in different ways. Among at least some
conservatives, this influence might reinforce, rather than
disrupt, preexisting attitudes about race and policing. This is

was written by then-Justice William Rehnquist, arguably the Court’s most
conservative member at the time.
407. See BAUM & DEVINS, supra note 67, at 9 (“Justices are members of
society and their decision making, over time, will reflect changes in the world
that the Justices inhabit.”).
408. See id. at 2 (“[P]artisan and ideological polarization of the current
era, polarization that has had its greatest effects in elite segments of
American society, has changed the Court in important ways.”); see also
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 89 (2006) (“[M]ost federal appellate judges shared elite social
origins. These origins affected judges’ own values . . . .”).
409. See BAUM & DEVINS, supra note 67, at 68 (“[M]ost Justices appointed
by presidents of both parties came from higher-status families and had legal
careers that made them part of an economic and social elite. Elites were not
separated by partisan ideology at this time; instead, class status transcended
party and ideology.”).
410. See id. at 131 (“The development of more distinct conservative and
liberal camps among social and political elites and the strengthening of the
overlap between party and ideology have helped to bring about affective
polarization.”).
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another way in which it is crucial to pay attention to the “we”
in assessing “what we all know is true.”
Still, there remains some overlap in the networks of liberal
and conservative judges, and some evidence that consensus
elite values continue to influence judges across the ideological
spectrum.411 Witness the ways in which conservative Justices
Brett Kavanaugh, John Roberts, and Samuel Alito make a
point of acknowledging the determined efforts of the LGBTQ
movement.412 Other telling, if anecdotal, examples point in the
same direction. These include Mitt Romney’s participation in a
Black Lives Matter march in early June of 2020;413 the public
letter of support for racial justice from former President
George W. Bush;414 and the support of top military officials for
renaming bases currently named for confederate generals.415
Our best guess is that political polarization will dampen
and skew, but not eliminate, the long-term impact of the
current movements for racial justice. But this is just a guess.
411. See id. (explaining that before 1990 “most highly educated
Republicans and Democrats converged on the very social issues that now
divide the parties” and that “even in the current period of high elite
polarization, there is a tendency . . . for pro-civil liberties decisions by the
Court . . . .”).
412. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1823 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The Court has previously stated, and I fully
agree, that gay and lesbian Americans ‘cannot be treated as social outcasts or
as inferior in dignity and worth.’”); id. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The
updating desire to which the Court succumbs no doubt arises from humane
and generous impulses.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the fairness and policy arguments for
same-sex marriage as having “undeniable appeal”). Of course, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Gorsuch did not only offer sympathetic words; they
joined the majority in Bostock. 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
413. See Paul LeBlanc & Ted Barrett, Romney Marches in Floyd Protest
‘To Make Sure People Understand That Black Lives Matter”, CNN (June 7,
2020), https://perma.cc/WL4P-XMR7.
414. See Press Release, George W. Bush Presidential Ctr., Statement by
President George W. Bush (June 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/JE93-JLNV (“It
remains a shocking failure that many African Americans, especially young
African American men, are harassed and threatened in their own country. It
is a strength when protestors, protected by responsible law enforcement,
march for a better future.”).
415. See John Ismay, The Army Was Open to Replacing Confederate Base
Names. Then Trump Said No, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/A97G-UWA3 (describing support of military leaders for base
name changes).
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Whether the George Floyd era will make a lasting impression
on the racial consciousness of federal judges as a group very
much remains to be seen. The obstacles ahead are daunting,
but more than anything else, this is what it will take for
advocates of governmental accountability to prevail in Round
Two of the battle over qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity has entered a new era. After years of
apparent impregnability, reform and even abolition of the
doctrine are now squarely on the legislative agenda. How long
this may take to achieve is anyone’s guess. But the
unexpectedness of this development has created a looming and
largely unanticipated danger. If and when qualified immunity
is abolished or reformed, there is good reason to believe this
will unleash a flood of new constitutional tort litigation,
creating serious docket-management problems for lower
federal courts. Those courts are already staggering under an
overwhelming caseload, and many of the tools available to
them for managing it have the potential to recreate qualified
immunity by another name. Even if no flood of cases actually
materializes, judges anticipating it may take preemptive action
that leaves constitutional tort plaintiffs little better off than
they are under the current qualified immunity regime.
Conceivably, plaintiffs could even end up worse off.
That is the bad news. The good news is that a
judicial-capacity motivated backlash to qualified immunity’s
demise is merely possible, not inevitable. Lower federal courts
have a wide array of options for managing an anticipated surge
in new filings. Most notably, they might employ creative case
management reforms, increasing the efficiency with which
they process cases without sacrificing decisional quality.
Alternatively, or in addition, judges might choose to divert
resources from other categories of cases. But neither is likely to
happen without a concerted effort. The time to prepare for such
an effort is now.

